Daily Archive

Canada is in the middle of a familiar temptation: the Americans are difficult, therefore the Chinese offer must be sane.

The immediate backdrop is concrete. On January 16, 2026, Canada announced a reset in economic ties with China that includes lowering barriers for a set number of Chinese EVs, while China reduces tariffs on key Canadian exports like canola. (Reuters) Washington responded with open irritation, warning Canada it may regret the move and stressing Chinese EVs will face U.S. barriers. (Reuters)

If you want a simple, pasteable bromide for people losing their minds online, it’s this: the U.S. and China both do bad things, but they do bad things in different ways, at different scales, with different “escape hatches.” One is a democracy with adversarial institutions that sometimes work. The other is a one-party state that treats accountability as a threat.

To make that visible, here are five egregious “hits” from each—then the contrast that actually matters.

Five things the United States does that Canadians have reason to resent

1) Protectionist trade punishment against allies

Steel/aluminum tariffs and recurring lumber duties are the classic pattern: national-interest rhetoric, domestic political payoff, allied collateral damage. Canada has repeatedly challenged U.S. measures on steel/aluminum and softwood lumber. (Global Affairs Canada)

Takeaway: the U.S. will squeeze Canada when it’s convenient—sometimes loudly, sometimes as a bureaucratic grind.

2) Energy and infrastructure whiplash

Keystone XL is the poster child of U.S. policy reversals that impose real costs north of the border and then move on. The project’s termination is documented by the company and Canadian/Alberta sources. (TC Energy)

Takeaway: the U.S. can treat Canadian capital as disposable when U.S. domestic politics flips.

3) Extraterritorial reach into Canadians’ private financial lives

FATCA and related information-sharing arrangements are widely experienced as a sovereignty irritant (and have been litigated in Canada). The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately declined to hear a constitutional challenge in 2023. (STEP)

Takeaway: the U.S. often assumes its laws get to follow people across borders.

4) A surveillance state that had to be restrained after the fact

Bulk telephone metadata collection under Patriot Act authorities became politically toxic and was later reformed/ended under the USA Freedom Act’s structure. (Default)

Takeaway: democracies can drift into overreach; the difference is that overreach can become a scandal, a law change, and a court fight.

5) The post-9/11 stain: indefinite detention and coercive interrogation

Guantánamo’s long-running controversy and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s reporting on the CIA program remain enduring examples of U.S. moral failure. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)

Takeaway: the U.S. is capable of serious rights abuses—then also capable of documenting them publicly, litigating them, and partially reversing course.

Five things the People’s Republic of China does that are categorically different

1) Mass rights violations against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang

The UN human rights office assessed serious human rights concerns in Xinjiang and noted that the scale of certain detention practices may constitute international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Canada has publicly echoed those concerns in multilateral statements. (OHCHR)

Takeaway: this is not “policy disagreement.” It’s a regime-scale human rights problem.

2) Hong Kong: the model of “one country, one party”

The ongoing use of the national security framework to prosecute prominent pro-democracy figures is a live, observable indicator of how Beijing treats dissent when it has full jurisdiction. (Reuters)

Takeaway: when Beijing says “stability,” it means obedience.

3) Foreign interference and transnational pressure tactics

Canadian public safety materials and parliamentary reporting describe investigations into transnational repression activity and concerns around “overseas police stations” and foreign influence. (Public Safety Canada)

Takeaway: the Chinese state’s threat model can extend into diaspora communities abroad.

4) Systematic acquisition—licit and illicit—of sensitive technology and IP

The U.S. intelligence community’s public threat assessment explicitly describes China’s efforts to accelerate S&T progress through licit and illicit means, including IP acquisition/theft and cyber operations. (Director of National Intelligence)

Takeaway: your “market partner” may also be running an extraction strategy against your innovation base.

5) Environmental and maritime predation at scale

China remains a dominant player in coal buildout even while expanding renewables, a dual-track strategy with global climate implications. (Financial Times)
On the oceans, multiple research and advocacy reports emphasize the size and global footprint of China’s distant-water fishing and associated IUU concerns. (Brookings)

Takeaway: when the state backs extraction, the externalities get exported.

Compare and contrast: the difference is accountability

If you read those lists and conclude “both sides are bad,” you’ve missed the key variable.

The U.S. does bad things in a system with adversarial leak paths:
investigative journalism, courts, opposition parties, congressional reports, and leadership turnover. That doesn’t prevent abuses. It does make abuses contestable—and sometimes reversible. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)

China does bad things in a system designed to prevent contestation:
one-party rule, censorship, legal instruments aimed at “subversion,” and a governance style that treats independent scrutiny as hostile action. The problem isn’t “China is foreign.” The problem is that the regime’s incentives run against transparency by design. (Reuters)

So when someone says, “Maybe we should pivot away from the Americans,” the adult response is:

• Yes, diversify.
• No, don’t pretend dependency on an authoritarian state is merely a swap of suppliers.

A quick media-literacy rule for your feed

If a post uses a checklist like “America did X, therefore China is fine,” it’s usually laundering a conclusion.

A better frame is risk profile:

• In a democracy, policy risk is high but visible—and the country can change its mind in public.
• In a one-party state, policy risk is lower until it isn’t—and then you discover the rules were never meant to protect you.

Canada can do business with anyone. But it should not confuse trade with trust, or frustration with Washington with safety in Beijing.

If Canada wants autonomy, the answer isn’t romanticizing China. It’s building a broader portfolio across countries where the rule of law is not a slogan in a press release.

References

• Canada–China trade reset (EV tariffs/canola): Reuters; Guardian. (Reuters)
• U.S. criticism of Canada opening to Chinese EVs: Reuters. (Reuters)
• U.S. tariffs/lumber disputes: Global Affairs Canada; Reuters. (Global Affairs Canada)
• Keystone XL termination: TC Energy; Government of Alberta. (TC Energy)
• FATCA Canadian challenge result: STEP (re Supreme Court dismissal). (STEP)
• USA Freedom Act / end of bulk metadata: Lawfare; Just Security. (Default)
• CIA detention/interrogation report: U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report PDF. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
• Guantánamo context: Reuters; Amnesty. (Reuters)
• Xinjiang assessment: OHCHR report + Canada multilateral statement. (OHCHR)
• Hong Kong NSL crackdown example: Reuters (Jimmy Lai). (Reuters)
• Transnational repression / overseas police station concerns: Public Safety Canada; House of Commons report PDF. (Public Safety Canada)
• China tech acquisition / IP theft framing: ODNI Annual Threat Assessment PDF. (Director of National Intelligence)
• Coal buildout: Financial Times; Reuters analysis. (Financial Times)
• Distant-water fishing footprint / IUU concerns: Brookings; EJF; Oceana. (Brookings)

• Reuters
• Reuters
• The Guardian