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Canada has entered the space race, and by “entered” I mean we appear to have placed a rectangle of concrete in the woods and surrounded it with gravel.

Canada’s space race appears to be stuck in Phase One: gravel.
This is not nothing. In government terms, it may already count as Phase One.
Somewhere, no doubt, there is a strategic framework, a ministerial announcement, a regional development grant, a climate lens, an Indigenous consultation pathway, a diversity procurement plan, and a glossy PDF featuring a child looking up at the stars. Canada loves a working group. It is how we convert urgency into chairs.
Meanwhile, private industry keeps doing the irritating thing it sometimes does: building things. Not perfectly, not gently, not without waste, ego, or spectacle. But the rockets exist. The launches happen. The failures produce data. The next version gets built. The machine moves.
Government moves too, but differently. It studies, regulates, announces, pauses, re-announces, commissions, rebrands, and eventually unveils a pad of poured concrete as evidence that the future has been properly consulted into existence.
This is the broader Canadian problem. We have become excellent at the language of ambition and strangely bad at the discipline of execution. We can describe innovation. We can fund innovation. We can convene panels on innovation. We can produce national strategies about innovation. But at some point, a serious country has to build the thing.
The comparison is unfair, of course. SpaceX is a private company with immense capital, a high tolerance for risk, and a founder constitutionally incapable of leaving well enough alone. Government has different responsibilities: accountability to citizens, laws, budgets, safety rules, and public interest.
Fair enough.
But accountability cannot become an alibi for paralysis. Regulation cannot become a substitute for competence. Process cannot become the product.
A country that wants a space industry needs more than a space-shaped clearing in the gravel. It needs permission to fail, speed to iterate, and institutions that understand the difference between managing decline and building capacity.
Canada does not lack talent, land, brains, or engineering ability. What it lacks is a governing culture that can still turn intention into machinery.
Until that changes, our space program may remain perfectly Canadian: safe, inclusive, fully consulted, and still waiting for liftoff.
Happy New Year! “What?!”, you say, doing a reflective piece to start the new year? Unpossible!!! – Yet here we are. Take care my friends and feisty commentariate in this next orbit around the Sun.
I recently asked an LLM—Grok—to analyze Dead Wild Roses.
He obliged.
The result was thoughtful, coherent, and broadly accurate. He traced the arc of the blog from its earlier left-skeptical roots through to its present preoccupations: feminism, free speech, gender ideology, institutional capture, moral certainty. As machine readings go, it was competent. Even generous.
And yet.
Reading it, I had the distinct sense of being seen from across the room, not spoken with.
So I did what seemed obvious: I asked another model—this one—for her reading.
I’m aware, of course, that large language models are not gendered. But anyone who works with them long enough knows that they nonetheless express distinct interpretive temperaments. If Grok reads like a brisk political cartographer—mapping positions, vectors, affiliations—this model reads more like a close reader of essays, arguments, and interior continuity.
That difference matters.
What He Saw (and What He Didn’t)
Grok understood the trajectory of the blog. He recognized that this was not a sudden ideological flip but a long, incremental evolution. He correctly identified a through-line of skepticism toward authority and moral certainty.
Where his reading thinned was not in what I believe, but in how I think.
His analysis treated the blog primarily as a political object—something that moved through ideological space. That’s not wrong, but it is partial.
Dead Wild Roses was never built to advocate a position. It was built to interrogate certainty—including my own.
What I’ve Always Been Doing Here
This blog has been many things over the years: atheist, feminist, skeptical, irritated, occasionally furious. But its core method has never changed.
It asks:
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What is being asserted as unquestionable?
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Who benefits from that assertion?
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What happens if we follow it all the way down?
When institutions began insisting that sex was a feeling, that language could override biology, that dissent was harm, that moral status preceded argument—the same skeptical machinery I once aimed outward turned inward.
That wasn’t betrayal.
It was consistency under pressure.
On Feminism and Material Reality
Yes, this is now read—accurately—as a sex-based feminist blog.
That’s not because identity doesn’t matter, but because material reality is the ground truth on which politics rests. Bodies come first. Law follows. Stories are last.
When political movements demand that we invert that order, something has gone deeply wrong—and feminism, if it is to mean anything at all, must notice.
That position is not reactionary. It is foundational.
Why Ask Two Models at All?
Because how something is read tells you as much about the reader as the text.
He read Dead Wild Roses as a location on a map.
She read it as a method in motion.
One isn’t false. But only one feels true.
The difference mirrors the very problem the blog keeps circling: the reduction of inquiry into identity, of thinking into stance, of method into tribe.
A Note on AI, Authority, and Voice
There is an irony here that isn’t lost on me.
I am using artificial intelligences to reflect on a body of writing that is deeply skeptical of outsourced authority. But that tension is precisely the point.
Tools can assist thinking.
They cannot replace it.
Maps can be useful.
They are not the territory.
Where This Leaves Me
If the last few years of Dead Wild Roses were about dismantling false moral certainty, the next may be about something harder and quieter:
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rebuilding meaning without mysticism,
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defending reality without cruelty,
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and learning how to live after the spell breaks.
I don’t know where that road leads.
But I know why I keep walking it.
And I know which readings—human or machine—feel like they’re walking with me rather than plotting me from above.
Postscript:
Throughout this piece, I’ve used “he” and “she” to distinguish between two AI systems with markedly different interpretive styles. This is not a claim about machine ontology. It is shorthand—imperfect, human, and serviceable.
Language exists to clarify thought. When it stops doing that, it’s time to change the language—not reality.
- Feminist Core: Radical feminist, prioritizing sex-based rights for women and girls. It defends single-sex spaces, opposes self-ID policies, and highlights issues like female erasure in language/institutions.
- Anti-“Woke” Left: Fiercely critical of contemporary progressive movements (e.g., trans-inclusive feminism, queer theory, intersectionality when it prioritizes gender identity over sex). The author sees these as betraying women’s rights and aligning with patriarchal or neoliberal interests.
- Free Speech and Anti-Authoritarianism: Strong defense of free expression, criticism of cancel culture, and opposition to what it views as state-enforced ideological conformity (e.g., hate speech laws, compelled apologies).
- Residual Left Elements: Occasional critiques of conservatism, capitalism, or religious fundamentalism persist, but the dominant tone is now combative toward the mainstream left.
- Not Right-Wing: Despite overlapping with conservative concerns on gender issues, the blog explicitly distances itself from right-wing politics and has historically opposed it.
Politically, this aligns with a growing cohort of “politically homeless” gender-critical leftists (similar to figures like J.K. Rowling or some detransitioner advocates) who feel exiled from progressive spaces but reject conservatism. The X bio (“Canadian barefoot dissident. Slaying gender ideology and postmodern fluff. Pro-merit, pro-naps, pro-Stoic vibes”) reinforces this: anti-ideological dogma, merit-based, individualistic.
To all of my friends and followers I wish you the most merry of holiday times. May the long nights be filled with warm blankets, hot chocolate, and holiday cheer. Thank you for your time and engagement here at DWR I appreciate your comments and contributions to the blog.
Bach’s Mass in B minor BWV 232 needs no introduction. It is “The Mass” that stands above all sacred works. I present it here in full realized by the Netherlands Bach Society.
May the Mass take you where you need to go to pause and reflect on this time year.
Happy Holidays, Folks! Take care of yourselves.
The Arbourist
The most devastating critique of expanded government economic power—whether advanced by the woke left or the postliberal right—rests not on the familiar warning that today’s weapon will be turned against us tomorrow, but on a deeper and more fundamental truth: government is constitutionally incapable of generating sustained abundance because it is always and everywhere a third-person economic actor. James Lindsay, building on Milton Friedman and Bob McEwen, distinguishes three categories of economic decision-making. First-person transactions occur when individuals spend their own money on their own needs; second-person transactions arise when either the money or the consumption belongs to someone else; third-person transactions, the exclusive domain of government, occur when an agent spends other people’s money on still other people’s needs. This final category produces a catastrophic double detachment from both cost and quality, rendering genuine wealth creation impossible no matter how noble the intention.
In first-person economics, the actor faces unrelenting pressure to balance cost against quality, efficiency against adequacy, and innovation against economy. Because the problem is his own and the resources are his own, he has every incentive to discover superior solutions and—under private property and profit—to scale those solutions for strangers whose problems he may not personally care about. The profit motive performs the miraculous feat of aligning naked self-interest with the systematic solving of dispersed human problems. Markets thus become discovery machines that generate exactly the surpluses society demands—no more, no less—while constantly punishing waste and rewarding improvement. Abundance emerges not from altruism but from an incentive structure that makes indifference compatible with service.
Government, by contrast, enters every economic arena as a pure third-person participant. Taxpayer funds are not its own, the services or goods it procures are not for its own consumption, and the bureaucrats or politicians who allocate resources face no personal bankruptcy for failure nor personal enrichment for success. Policy directives may demand “efficiency” or “innovation,” but these remain precatory slogans without the lash of loss or the lure of gain. The result is systemic waste, misallocation, and eventual stagnation. Historical episodes of apparent state-led productivity—Soviet industrialisation, Nazi rearmament, contemporary Chinese growth—prove the rule: they rely on forced mobilisation, suppressed consumption, and often plunder, and they collapse once the coercive surplus is exhausted and the misallocations compound.¹
The Chinese case, far from refuting the argument, illustrates its prescience. Beijing’s hybrid system permits profit only after political quotas are met and party loyalty is demonstrated. The resulting economy can indeed produce impressive physical output, yet it does so at the cost of collapsing total-factor productivity, ghost cities, and a property sector larger than the 1929 American bubble. Private entrepreneurs now husband cash and flee rather than invest, precisely because the third-person political actor can expropriate gains at will. What appears as hyperproductivity is in reality a sugar rush of debt and coercion, already giving way to the predictable hangover of a middle-income trap.²
The American founders understood that liberty and prosperity require strict limits on state economic power not merely to prevent tyranny but to preserve the only known incentive structure capable of producing general abundance. Proposals from Zohran Mkwana’s “no problem too small for government” socialism to JD Vance’s calls for state-directed “right-wing ends” share the same fatal flaw: they seek to achieve through third-person coercion what only first-person discovery coordinated by profit and price can deliver.³ Until the right grasps that government cannot be made to possess the correct incentives—any more than a square can be made circular—the allure of “using the state for our side” will continue to seduce and ultimately impoverish. True prosperity demands not a more muscular manager of the economy but the humbling recognition that no such manager can ever exist.
Endnotes
- Historical state-led cases: China, the USSR, and Nazi Germany achieved output spikes through coercion and consumption suppression, not sustainable productivity; each encountered severe misallocation and stagnation once coercive inputs were exhausted.
- China’s slowdown: China’s growth was driven by market liberalization (1978–2010) and reversed when political control tightened; falling TFP, capital flight, and overbuilding confirm the limits of state-led productivity.
- Incentive failure is structural: No ideological orientation can turn a bureaucracy into a profit-and-loss–disciplined discovery process; industrial policy without market discipline becomes third-person misallocation.

Glossary
First-person transaction: A situation where individuals spend their own money on their own needs.
Second-person transaction: A transaction where either the money or the consumption belongs to someone else.
Third-person transaction: When an agent (e.g., government) spends other people’s money on other people’s needs, lacking direct incentives for efficiency or quality.
Total-factor productivity (TFP): A measure of how efficiently an economy turns labor and capital into output.
Middle-income trap: When a developing country’s growth stalls after reaching middle-income status due to declining productivity and misallocation.
References
Foundational Economics & Productivity
- Solow, Robert. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.” Review of Economics and Statistics (1957).
https://doi.org/10.2307/1926047 - Baumol, William. The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t. Yale University Press (2012).
https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300179286/the-cost-disease/ - Gordon, Robert. The Rise and Fall of American Growth. Princeton University Press (2016).
https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691147727/the-rise-and-fall-of-american-growth
State Capacity, Bureaucracy, and Incentives
- Tullock, Gordon. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Public Affairs Press (1965).
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tullock-bureaucracy - Niskanen, William. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine-Atherton (1971).
https://www.cato.org/books/bureaucracy-representative-government - Hayek, F.A. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review (1945).
https://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html
Industrial Policy & Development Economics
- Rodrik, Dani. “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century.” Harvard University (2004).
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf - Amsden, Alice. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford University Press (1989).
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/asias-next-giant-9780195076035 - Wade, Robert. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton University Press (2003).
https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691117294/governing-the-market
China’s Growth and Slowdown
- Brandt, Loren; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes; Zhang, Yifan. “Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-Level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing.” Journal of Development Economics (2012).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.02.001 - Pritchett, Lant & Summers, Lawrence. “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean.” NBER Working Paper No. 20573 (2014).
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20573
Nordic Economies & Welfare States
- Bergh, Andreas & Henrekson, Magnus. Government Size and Implications for Economic Growth. AEI Press (2011).
https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/government-size-and-implications-for-economic-growth/ - OECD Data on Nordic Economies.
https://data.oecd.org/
Market Failure, Government Failure, Incentives
- Coase, Ronald. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics (1960).
https://www.jstor.org/stable/724810 - Kirzner, Israel. Competition and Entrepreneurship. University of Chicago Press (1973).
https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo5972460.html
Technology, Innovation & Productivity Slowdown
- Bloom, Nicholas et al. “Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?” American Economic Review (2020).
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20180338


Christopher Hitchens, ever the unflinching provocateur, levels a stark charge against religion: it imperils morality, breeding selfishness and stupidity under the guise of piety. In his words, the evidence mounts on every side that faith not only fails as a moral arbiter but actively corrodes human potential, turning inward gazes toward dogma rather than outward toward shared humanity. This critique resonates when one pores over sacred texts or historical annals, where contradictions abound and ethical lapses reveal the frail scaffolding of divine claims. Yet such scrutiny, while indispensable, risks eclipsing a broader vista, where religion’s flaws yield to its functional virtues in the grand theater of human society.
For the vast middle stratum of humanity, those ensnared by daily exigencies and spared the luxury of philosophical rumination, religion serves as an unpolished but efficacious bulwark. It furnishes hope amid despair, direction in disarray, and a rudimentary moral compass to steer the uninitiated through existential tempests. Empirical patterns affirm this role: religious priming fosters prosocial behaviors, from amplified generosity to bolstered communal ties, while global surveys depict faith as a stabilizing force across diverse polities. Here, the institution transcends its doctrinal frailties, operating less as metaphysical truth than as sociological salve, channeling primal impulses toward cohesion rather than chaos. To dismiss it outright ignores how it equips the multitude for endurance, sparing them the abyss of unexamined voids.
This duality underscores a profound tension: religion thrives inversely to the intensity of its interrogation. Up close, it falters, inviting Hitchens’s scorn; at scale, it endures, a pragmatic hedge against nihilism’s chill. As secular currents erode its grip, one must ponder whether its communal scaffold will atrophy into irrelevance or harden into reactionary fervor. The verifiable record tilts toward adaptation, not extinction, reminding us that truth in such matters demands not polemic but proportion—a measured reckoning that honors critique without forsaking utility. In threading this needle, we glimpse religion not as eternal verity or infernal deceit, but as a human artifact, imperfect yet indispensable in its hour.


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