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Collin May has published a long, ambitious essay in the C2C journal (Hearts of Darkness: How the Left Uses Hate to Fuel its 21st Century Universal Imperium) on cancel culture, “hate” rhetoric, and the modern left’s moral posture. It is broader than I would write, more philosophical than most readers will tolerate, and occasionally overbuilt. But it names a pattern that matters, and one I return to often here: once “hate” becomes a universal accusation, institutions stop persuading and start policing.
May’s most useful contribution is not just the complaint (“cancel culture exists”) but the mechanism: “hate” stops being a moral description and becomes a category that pre-sorts who may be argued with and who may simply be managed.
That is the issue.
Not whether hatred exists. It does. Not whether some speech is vicious. It is. The issue is what happens when “hate” becomes the default label for disagreement, skepticism, refusal, dissent, or plain moral and factual judgments that cut against elite narratives.
At that point, the term stops describing and starts doing administrative work.
You can watch this happen across the institutions that shape public life: media, HR departments, professional bodies, universities, bureaucracies, and the expanding quasi-legal space around speech regulation. The sequence is familiar. Someone raises a concern about policy, ideology, language rules, school programming, medical ethics, public safety, immigration, religion, or sex-based rights. Instead of answering the argument, the institution reframes the speaker. Not wrong—harmful. Not questioning—spreading hate. Not participating in democratic friction—a threat to social order.
That move changes the rules of engagement. A wrong claim can be debated. A “hateful” claim can be quarantined. Once a claim is reclassified as harm rather than argument, the institutional response changes with it: less rebuttal, more restriction.
This language matters because it is not only moral language. It is managerial language. It justifies deplatforming, censorship, professional discipline, reputational destruction, and exclusion from ordinary civic legitimacy. It creates a class of people whose arguments no longer need to be answered on the merits. It also trains bystanders to confuse moral panic with moral seriousness.
May explains this through a large historical and philosophical genealogy. Fair enough. I am less interested in the full genealogy than in the practical result in front of us. In plain terms: the rhetoric of “hate” is often used to centralize authority in institutions that no longer trust the public and no longer feel obliged to reason with them.
That is one reason trust keeps collapsing.
People can live with disagreement. They can even live with policies they dislike. What they do not tolerate for long is being handled—being told their questions are illegitimate before they are heard. Once citizens conclude that institutions are using moral language as a shield against scrutiny, every future statement gets discounted. Even true statements are heard as spin.
And then the damage compounds. If “hate” is defined so broadly that it includes dissent, genuinely hateful speech becomes harder to identify and confront. The category gets inflated, politicized, and cheapened. Meanwhile, ordinary democratic disagreement becomes harder to conduct without professional or social risk.
That is not a confident free society. It is a managerial one.
Canada is not exempt. We have our own versions of this habit: speech debates reframed as safety debates, policy criticism recoded as identity harm, and public disputes (including over schools, sex-based rights, and even routine civic rituals like land acknowledgements) routed through tribunals, regulators, HR offices, and media scripts instead of open argument. The details vary by case. The mechanism does not. This tactic is not unique to one political tribe, but it is now especially entrenched in progressive-managerial institutions, which is precisely why it has so much reach.
The answer is not to deny hatred exists, or to become casual about cruelty. The answer is to recover civic discipline.
Name actual incitement when it occurs. Enforce existing laws where there are real threats, harassment, or violence. But stop using “hate” as a catch-all for disfavoured views. Stop treating condemnation as a substitute for evidence. Stop teaching institutions that the way to win an argument is to disqualify the speaker.
May quotes Pope Francis on cancel culture as something that “leaves no room.” Whether or not one follows his full historical argument, that phrase captures the operational problem.
A liberal society cannot function if citizens are only permitted to disagree inside moral boundaries drawn in advance by bureaucrats, activists, and legacy media.
The test is simple: can a claim be examined without first being moralized into silence?
If the answer is no, that is not moral confidence. It is institutional insecurity backed by power.
That is the pattern worth naming. And that is why essays like May’s, even when they overshoot, remain worth reading.

References
Collin May, “Hearts of Darkness: How the Left Uses Hate to Fuel its 21st Century Universal Imperium,” C2C Journal (February 16, 2026), https://c2cjournal.ca/2026/02/hearts-of-darkness-how-the-left-uses-hate-to-fuel-its-21st-century-universal-imperium/. (C2C Journal)
Social media is not a neutral information pipeline. It is a distribution system for identity scripts, status incentives, and institutional messaging aimed at children and adolescents.
The internet matters, but the internet is not the first mover. The first mover is often the institution. Child-facing media packages contested identity-adjacent material in a glowing register—creativity, confidence, self-expression, empowerment—then platforms do what platforms do: amplify, repeat, and reward.
That sequence matters. Parents know the internet is porous and chaotic. Institutional children’s programming arrives pre-approved. It signals safety. It signals legitimacy. By the time a clip hits the feed, it is not just content. It is content stamped with adult authority.
Criticism of this pattern is routinely framed as hostility to “queer youth.” That framing is too convenient. The stronger criticism is about frameworks.
Some strands of queer activism are not simply asking for tolerance or protection from abuse. They are explicitly suspicious of norms as such, and in some cases treat norm disruption as a political good. Adults can debate that project in adult spaces. The problem begins when a norm-disruptive framework is repackaged as child guidance and presented as developmental common sense.
Developmental psychology matters here as a guardrail. Piaget’s core point still stands: children do not think like adults; reasoning develops in stages. Erikson likewise treats identity formation as developmental, social, and staged. Children and early adolescents are especially sensitive to imitation, belonging, prestige, and adult cues. That does not mean they lack an inner life. It means adults should not hand them high-status identity templates and call it pure self-discovery.
The question is not whether vulnerable youth exist. They do. The question is whether activist frameworks built to challenge adult social norms should be translated into child-facing institutional messaging as if they were straightforwardly age-appropriate. On that question, skepticism is not cruelty. It is adult judgment.
Public argument usually collapses here. One side calls it moral panic. The other calls it recruitment. Both are lazy.
Children are impressionable. Social learning is real. Status-seeking is real. Identity experimentation is real. None of that requires conspiracy thinking. It also does not justify a cartoon model of causation where one video produces one outcome. The serious concern is cumulative: repeated exposure, emotional framing, peer reinforcement, institutional endorsement, and algorithmic repetition shape what children perceive as admirable, normal, and socially rewarded.
That concern becomes more serious when the surrounding issue can become clinical. Once clinical pathways enter the picture, the adult burden of care rises. “Let kids explore” is not a sufficient standard when the surrounding culture is supplying scripts, rewards, and institutional validation at scale.
The evidence conversation has to stay honest. Research on social media and transgender or gender-diverse youth supports a mixed picture: online spaces can correlate with distress, discrimination, and problematic use, while also providing support, connection, and relief from offline isolation. Used carelessly, that literature gets abused in both directions—either as proof of “brainwashing” or as proof that social influence is irrelevant.
The more useful point is simpler: institutions increasingly present contested identity material to children in the language of celebration before they provide any framework for developmental caution. The sequencing is wrong. The tone is wrong. The confidence is often ahead of the evidence.
A sane standard is still available. Some online spaces help marginalized youth. Some online dynamics intensify confusion, distress, and imitation. Institutions should not present complex identity performance to children as if there are no downstream risks, tradeoffs, or developmental questions.
That is not cruelty. It is adult supervision.
The deeper problem is cultural, not merely digital. We outsource moral formation to feeds, then act surprised when children absorb what the feed rewards. Social media amplifies. Schools legitimize. Media narrates. Government ratifies. Then the shift is described as organic.
It is not fully organic. It is curated.
That does not mean every child in these spaces is inauthentic. It means authenticity itself is now being shaped inside an environment saturated with scripts, incentives, and prestige signals children are poorly equipped to evaluate critically.
If standards do not return, institutions will keep mistaking early exposure for compassion, and children will keep paying for adult vanity dressed up as progress.
References
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Piaget, Jean, and Bärbel Inhelder. The Psychology of the Child.
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Erikson, Erik H. Identity: Youth and Crisis.
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Halperin, David M. Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography. Oxford University Press, 1995.
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Keenan, H., and Lil Miss Hot Mess. “Drag Pedagogy: The Playful Practice of Queer Imagination in Early Childhood.” Curriculum Inquiry (2021). DOI: 10.1080/03626784.2020.1864621.
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CBC Kids News / Drag Kids segment (2017, resurfaced clip).
This is a common activist argument. It often arrives pre-loaded with moral certainty, as if the analogy itself settles the question. That should set off your spider-senses immediately: when moral certitude and ideological correctness are doing the work, argumentative rigour usually is not.
The claim is familiar. Left-handedness once looked rare because it was stigmatized and suppressed; stigma eased, reported rates rose. Therefore, the rise in transgender identification among youth should be read the same way.
The analogy is rhetorically useful. It is also weak.
It forces two different kinds of phenomena into one moral script. Left-handedness is a motor preference: early-emerging, directly observable, and generally stable across the life course. Childhood transgender identification is not that. It involves self-interpretation, language, social meaning, and developmental concepts that mature unevenly. Whatever one’s broader politics, these are not the same kind of thing. Treating them as equivalent does not clarify the issue. It pre-loads the conclusion.
The first failure is developmental. Handedness does not require a child to grasp an abstract social category. A child reaches for a spoon, a crayon, a ball. The preference is visible in action. Gender identity claims are different. They depend on how a child understands sex categories, role expectations, persistence over time, and what it means to “be” a boy or girl beyond clothing, imitation, or preference. That is a heavier cognitive task. Piaget and Kohlberg do not settle today’s policy disputes, but they do establish a relevant caution: young children often reason concretely, and stable identity concepts develop in stages. A child can show a hand preference before the child can fully articulate an abstract identity claim in a mature sense.
That difference changes what counts as evidence. Handedness does not need interpretive reinforcement to remain legible. It persists without adults affirming a narrative about the child’s inner state. Childhood gender self-description does not operate that way. It unfolds inside a social field: family language, peer dynamics, institutional scripts, online models, and adult interpretation. Saying that does not make every case shallow or insincere. It does mean the left-handedness analogy smuggles in false simplicity by equating a physical preference with a socially mediated self-concept.
The second failure is pattern. The rise in reported left-handedness is commonly explained, in large part, by declining suppression and changing norms around forcing children to write with the right hand. The increase was broad and gradual. It was not driven by intense peer clustering in narrow demographic bands. Recent increases in transgender identification among youth have shown a different profile, including marked concentration in particular age and sex cohorts in some settings. That pattern is harder to explain by destigmatization alone. At minimum, it supports a mixed account in which social influence, peer effects, and online environments may contribute in some cases. That is not proof of a single-cause “contagion” model for every child. It is enough to show that the left-handedness analogy is doing more moral work than explanatory work.
The third failure is stability. Handedness, once established, is typically stable and does not initiate a pathway of medical intervention. Childhood gender distress is more variable. Longitudinal studies from earlier clinic-referred cohorts often found that many children presenting with gender dysphoria did not continue to identify as transgender in adulthood, especially after puberty. Those findings need careful handling. They come from older cohorts, older diagnostic frameworks, and a literature now heavily contested on definitions and generalizability. Even with those caveats, the central point remains: childhood gender distress has historically shown developmental fluidity in a way handedness does not. That alone should make the analogy suspect.
The practical asymmetry is harder to ignore. If society was wrong to suppress left-handedness, the correction was simple: stop forcing children to switch hands. No endocrine pathway. No fertility implications. No irreversible surgeries. No high-stakes clinical decisions under uncertainty. Pediatric gender care is not identical in stakes or consequences. That does not answer every clinical question. It does mean “this is just like left-handedness” is not an argument. It is a reassurance strategy.
A more honest framing is available. Stigma can affect disclosure and prevalence reporting without making every rise in identification analogous to left-handedness. Some young people experience deep and persistent gender distress. Childhood identity development is also shaped by cognition, peers, institutions, and timing. Those claims can coexist. Compassion does not require category collapse.
The left-handedness comparison survives because it is emotionally efficient. It offers a ready-made progress narrative and casts skeptics as yesterday’s moral failures. Efficient is not the same thing as accurate. If the aim is responsible care for vulnerable young people, the first obligation is conceptual hygiene: use comparisons that illuminate developmental reality, not analogies that flatten it.

References
- Kohlberg, L. (1966). A cognitive-developmental analysis of children’s sex-role concepts and attitudes. In E. E. Maccoby (Ed.), The Development of Sex Differences. Stanford University Press.
- Gilbert, A. N., & Wysocki, C. J. (1992). Hand preference and age in the United States. Neuropsychologia, 30(7), 601–608.
- Steensma, T. D., Biemond, R., de Boer, F., & Cohen-Kettenis, P. T. (2011). Desisting and persisting gender dysphoria after childhood: A qualitative follow-up study. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 16(4), 499–516.
- Singh, D., Bradley, S. J., & Zucker, K. J. (2021). A follow-up study of boys with gender identity disorder. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 12, 632784.
- Cass, H. (2024). Independent Review of Gender Identity Services for Children and Young People (Final Report).
Canada’s Bill C-4 was sold as a targeted ban on abusive “conversion therapy.” That goal of ending coercive, shame-based attempts to “pray the gay away”is legitimate, and the harms from such practices are well documented. (Library of Parliament)
But C-4 didn’t stop at prohibiting coercion. It built contested premises about “gender identity” into the Criminal Code—then wrapped ordinary clinical caution in legal risk. For children, that’s not a symbolic problem. It’s a downstream harm problem.
1) C-4 hard-codes a contested concept into criminal scope
The Criminal Code definition of “conversion therapy” includes any “practice, treatment or service designed to… change a person’s gender identity to cisgender,” or “repress… a person’s non-cisgender gender identity.” (Department of Justice Canada)
That’s not the same category as sexual orientation. Whatever one’s politics, “gender identity” is not measured like blood pressure. In real child psychotherapy, you do differential diagnosis: you test hypotheses, you treat comorbidities, you watch patterns over time, you revisit interpretations.
C-4 makes one interpretive direction toward “cisgender”a uniquely danger to be seen as the “design” of therapy. (Department of Justice Canada)
2) The preamble signals something stronger than “don’t abuse people”
The Act’s preamble denounces “myths and stereotypes,” including “the myth that… cisgender gender identity… [and] gender expression that conforms to the sex assigned… are to be preferred over other… gender identities.” (Parliament of Canada)
Supporters will say this is a dignity claim: no one should be pressured to “be cis.” Fine. But when Parliament declares a core premise a “myth,” it doesn’t just condemn abuse it pressures institutions to treat skepticism as suspect.
In therapy, that matters, because the clinician’s job is not to recite a moral slogan. It’s to find the causal engine of distress in a specific child.
3) “Exploration” is permitted—until it looks like exploration with a destination
C-4 includes a “for greater certainty” carve-out for “exploration or development of an integrated personal identity… such as… gender transition,” provided the service is not “based on an assumption that a particular… gender identity… is to be preferred over another.” (Department of Justice Canada)
Here’s the problem: in actual clinical practice, the line between exploration and influence is not a clean statutory boundary.
A careful therapist might say:
- “Let’s treat anxiety/OCD first and see what remains.”
- “Let’s explore trauma and dissociation before we interpret identity claims.”
- “Let’s reduce online reinforcement and stabilize sleep, mood, and social stress.”
- “Let’s slow down—puberty is a confounder, not an oracle.”
That’s not “conversion.” That’s normal clinical sequencing.
But under C-4’s language, a motivated complainant (or risk-averse administrator) can reframe caution as an attempt to “repress” a non-cis identity, or as therapy “designed” to steer toward “cisgender.” (Department of Justice Canada)
Even if a prosecution is unlikely, the chilling effect doesn’t require convictions. It only requires enough ambiguity that clinicians and clinics decide it’s not worth the exposure.
4) This isn’t “college policy.” It’s Criminal Code territory.
Bill C-4 received Royal Assent on December 8, 2021 and came into force in January 2022. (Parliament of Canada)
It created Criminal Code offences around causing someone to undergo conversion therapy, promoting/advertising it, and profiting from it. (Parliament of Canada)
So when therapists ask, “Can I safely do exploratory work with this child without being accused of ‘conversion’?” they are not being melodramatic. They are doing what professionals do when lawmakers write broad definitions: they assume the worst plausible reading—and they self-censor.
5) Why this hits children hardest
Adults can absorb bad ideology and still have time to course-correct. Kids often can’t.
Children need therapy that is:
- exploratory (many hypotheses, not one script),
- developmentally sober (puberty changes the picture),
- comorbidity-first (anxiety, depression, autism traits, trauma, dissociation),
- family-systems aware (parents are usually the safety net, not “the enemy”),
- outcome-humble (no foreclosed conclusions).
C-4 subtly tilts the playing field: it makes “don’t be seen as steering away from trans identity” the safest institutional posture regardless of whether that posture serves the child in front of you.
6) Why this question is sharper now
After the February 10, 2026 Tumbler Ridge shootings, public attention has turned—again—to institutional failure chains: mental health, gatekeeping, warning signs, and what “care” actually means when a young person is unstable. The BC RCMP’s Feb 13 update refers to autopsies for “eight victims and the suspect” (nine deceased total), and notes ongoing review of prior interactions with the suspect. (RCMP)
A tragedy doesn’t “prove” a policy critique. But it does remove the luxury of pretending that scripts are the same thing as safeguards.
A better standard (without reviving abusive conversion practices)
If Parliament’s aim is to ban coercion and fraud, it can do so cleanly without criminalizing clinical caution.
A fix would explicitly protect:
- Open-ended psychotherapy for gender distress, including differential diagnosis and comorbidity treatment.
- Neutral therapeutic goals (reducing distress, improving functioning, strengthening self-acceptance) without predetermining identity outcomes.
- The clinician’s ability to discuss biological sex reality, uncertainty, and developmental pathways without that being treated as “preference” or “myth.” (Parliament of Canada)
- Bright-line prohibitions aimed at the actual evils: coercion, aversive techniques, confinement, threats, and misrepresentation.
Canada can still denounce abuse and defend evidence-based exploration. Kids deserve therapists unbound by ideology—not just ideology unbound by evidence.

References
- Bill C-4 — First Reading (House of Commons) — Nov 29, 2021
https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-4/first-reading
Source: (Parliament of Canada) - Bill C-4 — Third Reading (House of Commons) — Dec 1, 2021
https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-4/third-reading
Source: (Parliament of Canada) - Bill C-4 — Royal Assent (Chapter 24) — Dec 8, 2021
https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-4/royal-assent
Source: (Parliament of Canada)
Core legal text (Criminal Code, consolidated)
- Criminal Code — s. 320.101 (definition + exploration carve-out)
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-320.101.html - Statutes of Canada 2021, c. 24 (Annual Statutes full text — includes preamble)
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2021_24/FullText.html
Official legislative record / metadata (timeline, status)
- LEGISinfo — Bill C-4 (44-1) (dates, stages, summary trail)
https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-4
Source: (Parliament of Canada)
Neutral institutional summary
- Library of Parliament — Legislative Summary (PDF)
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2022/bdp-lop/ls/YM32-3-441-C4-eng.pdf
Source: (Government of Canada Publications)
Government explainer / enforcement framing
- Justice Canada — “Conversion therapy” page (in-force date, offences overview)
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/ct-tc/p1.html
Context reference used in the essay (Tumbler Ridge)
- RCMP — Tumbler Ridge investigative update (Feb 13, 2026)
https://rcmp.ca/en/bc/tumbler-ridge/news/2026/02/4350292





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