You are currently browsing the category archive for the ‘Politics’ category.
If a government’s job is to steward the conditions for ordinary people to build, trade, invest, and plan a life, then our federal leadership has been doing that job badly.
Not because Canadians are lazy. Not because the world is easy. But because the governing reflex is wrong: when something breaks, Ottawa reaches for a new program, a new credit, a new rebate, a new subsidy, a new “strategy.” It treats the economy like a patient that can be stabilized indefinitely with IV drips.
That approach can buy headlines. It cannot buy prosperity.
The best indicator is per-person performance. We can argue about which yardstick matters most, but the story is consistent: Canadians are producing less per person than we should be, relative to peers and especially relative to the United States. When per-capita output stagnates, everything gets harder at once: housing feels unaffordable, healthcare feels strained, wages feel thin, and every problem becomes a fight over slices instead of a discussion about baking more bread.
The policy style matters because it shapes incentives. When governments patch symptoms with cash transfers while leaving the cost structure and the approval structure untouched, they teach the country the wrong lesson: don’t fix the machine; keep bribing the machine not to squeal.
The mechanism: why “more programs” keeps failing
Here’s the basic mechanism, stripped of moral drama:
- High costs and slow approvals choke supply.
Housing, energy, infrastructure, major projects, even small-business expansions: Canada is a country that says “no” and “later” far more often than it says “yes” and “go.” Every delay is a tax. Every duplicated review is a tax. Every veto point is a tax. - Government then tries to “help” people pay the tax it created.
Rebates, credits, subsidies, targeted relief. It’s a strange kind of compassion that insists on first inflating the cost of living and then offering a coupon to survive it. - Those programs don’t increase productivity.
They redistribute purchasing power. Sometimes that’s justified in emergencies. But as a governing model it becomes a treadmill: you need ever-larger transfers to offset the same underlying frictions. - Meanwhile investment goes elsewhere.
Capital avoids uncertainty, delays, and politicized approvals. If the return on effort is higher across the border, it doesn’t matter how many committees we convene about “competitiveness.” The money leaves. So do the high-productivity jobs.
That’s the loop.
Steelman: “But the government is trying to protect people”
Yes. There are real hardships and real shocks: pandemic aftershocks, energy volatility, inflation waves. A modern state can’t pretend none of that exists.
But a serious government distinguishes relief from policy habit.
Relief is temporary and humble. It treats symptoms while it removes the causes.
Policy habit is permanent and proud. It treats symptoms and declares victory.
Canada’s problem is not that government ever helps. It’s that government too often helps in a way that replaces fixing the constraints. Then it wonders why the constraints keep biting.
The verdict
If your economic model is “make life expensive, then subsidize the expense,” you don’t get abundance. You get dependency, resentment, and a widening gap with jurisdictions that still know how to build.
You also get a politics where every election becomes a bidding war over who will mail the bigger cheque, because structural reform has been quietly taken off the table.
That’s not leadership. It’s managed decline with better graphics.
Three solutions that trust Canadians
These aren’t “one weird trick” fixes. They’re principles that put choice back in the hands of households and entrepreneurs rather than bureaucracies.
1) Let people keep more of what they earn, especially on essentials
If Ottawa wants to help with affordability, it should stop pretending price pressures are solved by “targeted” programs. The cleanest help is broad, simple tax relief that lets people choose.
- Cut taxes that hit basics hardest (and stop layering cost-pushers into the production chain).
- Prefer lower rates and fewer carve-outs over boutique credits that require a rulebook and a caseworker to access.
- If a policy goal requires a price signal, keep it simple and transparent, not buried across permits, compliance, and pass-through.
This trusts Canadians because it doesn’t tell them what to buy. It stops taking their money and then re-selling it back to them with a government logo.
2) Slash approval times and regulatory duplication so builders can build
Canada does not have a “housing feelings” problem. It has a permission structure problem.
- Set hard timelines for approvals and treat missed deadlines as automatic escalation or approval, not “we’ll get back to you.”
- Collapse overlapping reviews and require agencies to coordinate rather than serially veto.
- Align incentives so provinces and municipalities that approve homes and infrastructure fast aren’t punished for growth.
This trusts Canadians because it assumes the default answer to a lawful project is “yes,” and it lets builders, trades, and communities respond to demand without waiting years for permission.
3) Open the country internally: real competition, real mobility, real choice
A country shouldn’t feel like 10 small markets with paperwork toll booths between them.
- Remove internal trade barriers so goods, services, and workers can move freely across provinces.
- Make credential recognition faster for skilled trades and professionals so talent isn’t trapped behind provincial gatekeeping.
- Reduce the habit of picking “future sectors” by subsidy and instead create conditions where any sector can win if it serves customers.
This trusts Canadians because it relies on competition and mobility, not bureaucratic selection. It lets consumers choose, lets workers move, and lets businesses scale without needing a lobbyist.
If Ottawa keeps governing by bandage, the next few years will look like the last: higher spending, louder announcements, thinner per-person results, and a country that feels like it’s working harder for less. The gap won’t close by intention. It will close only when we stop confusing “more government activity” with “more national competence.”
Tyler Cowen once tried to name the biggest “revolutions” he’s lived through—moon landing, collapse of communism, the internet, and now AI. In the middle of that list he drops one that most people still don’t treat like a revolution at all: “Feminization.” (Marginal REVOLUTION)
That word isn’t a complaint. It’s a category. It says: a long-run compositional change is underway, and it matters.
Helen Andrews’ “Great Feminization” thesis—popularized in a talk and elaborated in her Compact essay—takes the next step: as women become a larger share of institutions, institutions don’t merely “include” women; they become substantively feminized, and what we call “wokeness” is basically the cultural exhaust of that process. (Compact)
Here’s my position up front: the demographic shift is real and measurable in Canada; the “feminization = wokeness” equation is an overconfident master key.
It explains too much, too easily, by psychologizing demographics instead of interrogating incentives.
Canadian anchors: the shift is measurable (not vibes)
Start with a handful of Canadian facts you can actually point to.
- Parliament: the House of Commons sits at 104 women out of 343 MPs (30.3%). (IPU Parline)
- Judiciary: the share of federally appointed judges who are women rose from 43.8% (2021) to 46.7% (2023), per Statistics Canada. (Statistics Canada)
- Universities: women are 43.7% of full-time teaching staff in 2024/2025, up from 15.9% in 1984/1985. (Statistics Canada)
- Management: women are 51.9% of public-sector managers but 35.2% of private-sector managers (2023), and hold 42.7% of middle management vs 30.8% of senior management (2021). (Statistics Canada)
- Psychology (Alberta snapshot): Job Bank puts psychologists at 81% women / 19% men in Alberta. (Job Bank)
You don’t need to think any of this is good or bad to recognize the basic point: elite and semi-elite Canadian pipelines have changed composition in living memory. The “Great Feminization,” at minimum, names something real.
Why composition changes institutions (and why noticing this isn’t misogyny)
Here’s the move that poisons discussion: someone observes a demographic shift and asks what it does to norms; the response is to treat the question itself as hatred.
That’s not an argument; it’s a veto.
Institutions aren’t just rulebooks. They are reward systems: what gets you promoted, what gets you ostracized, what gets you hauled into a meeting, what everyone learns not to say out loud. When composition changes, the informal equilibrium can change too—sometimes for the better, sometimes not.
Before anyone reaches for the “misogyny” stamp, three obvious distinctions:
- Descriptive claims aren’t moral verdicts. Saying “X is now 47% female” is not saying “women ruined X.”
- Group averages aren’t destinies. Even if differences exist on average, overlap is huge. Plenty of women are rule-first and combative; plenty of men are harmony-first and censorious.
- The target is incentives, not women. If a system rewards reputational risk-avoidance and punishes open conflict, it will drift toward soft enforcement and speech management—regardless of who staffs it.
Those distinctions don’t sanitize the topic. They make it discussable.
Where Andrews helps—and where her thesis becomes a master key
Steelman Andrews first: she’s right that the shift is large, and she’s right that institutions can be remade through changes in who occupies them. If you pretend otherwise, you’re pretending humans don’t do social enforcement.
Where she overreaches is the claim (often treated as self-evident) that “feminization = wokeness.” (Compact)
Two problems.
1) One variable can’t carry a multi-cause phenomenon
The rise of “woke” managerial dynamics tracks at least four forces that are not reducible to gender composition:
- social media: instant reputational escalation; permanent records of mistakes; a public audience for internal disputes
- liability culture: institutions optimizing to avoid lawsuits, complaints, and scandal
- bureaucratic expansion: more compliance, more policy, more internal language policing
- credential sorting: ideological clustering in certain professional strata
In Canada, you can see the basic direction without naming villains: risk management becomes a career track; “process” becomes protection; disputes become “incidents”; leaders learn to value quiet over truth because quiet is legible as safety.
You can believe feminization is one contributor. But treating it as the engine is an interpretive leap, not an established causal law.
2) It tempts essentialism even when it gestures at nuance
If “wokeness” is “women’s morality,” you’ve turned a complex institutional pathology into a personality profile of half the species. That’s analytically brittle and politically stupid: it hands critics the easiest rebuttal (“you’re essentializing women”) and it blinds you to male-led versions of the same pathologies (purges, conformity spirals, status policing), which history supplies in bulk.
If you want to criticize a norm regime, criticize the regime. Don’t smuggle in contempt.
What the evidence can support—more modestly
A defensible claim, one that doesn’t require you to psychologize women as a class, looks like this:
- Some sex-linked preference gaps show up in some contexts, especially around speech, conflict, and social sanction. For example, a Knight Foundation/College Pulse study reports large gender differences among U.S. college students: 41% of college women prioritized protecting free speech versus 71% of college men, while women were more likely to prioritize promoting an inclusive society.
- Institutions are sensitive to preference distributions because norms are enforced socially, not just formally.
- Incentives decide which preferences become “policy.” Liability, reputation, and managerial bureaucracy amplify harm-avoidance.
And this is the part Andrews gestures at, but doesn’t fully own: if you want to understand modern speech policing, HR creep, and the new professional fearfulness, start with incentives. The incentives turn every controversy into a corporate emergency; then people behave accordingly.
On that view, feminization isn’t the whole story. It’s a relevant input—and its effects depend on the system it enters.
The real Canadian question: can we preserve hard virtues mid-transition?
Canada is useful here because we’re visibly mid-shift rather than at some imagined endpoint. Parliament is at 30% women, not parity. (IPU Parline) The federal judiciary is closing on parity. (Statistics Canada) Universities have moved dramatically since the 1980s, but remain below parity in full-time teaching staff. (Statistics Canada) Management splits sharply by public vs private sector, and senior leadership remains male-skewed. (Statistics Canada)
So the live question isn’t “should women be here?” They are here, and they belong here.
The question is narrower and more urgent:
As composition changes, what norms do we want to protect because they are fragile?
A short list:
- due process and evidence standards (law)
- viewpoint tolerance and intellectual risk-taking (academia)
- candid disagreement and non-performative conflict (organizations)
- the capacity to make decisions that feel “unkind” but are necessary (policy)
If you think those virtues are real and fragile, you don’t need to scapegoat women. You need to design institutions that reward truth-telling and competence more than “harm management” and reputational prophylaxis. That means fewer performative “values” rituals and more procedural backbone: clear standards, clearer speech norms, and leaders who can say “no” without laundering it through therapy language.
Verdict and prediction
The Great Feminization is real in Canada. The numbers are not subtle. (IPU Parline)
But “feminization = wokeness” is a bad master key. It explains too much, too easily, by psychologizing demographics rather than interrogating incentives. (Compact)
My bet is that the next decade won’t be settled by shouting “misogyny” or shouting “women did this.” It will be settled by whether our institutions relearn a difficult skill: distinguishing “this feels harmful” from “this is false,” and building cultures where adults can endure disagreement without turning every conflict into a moral emergency.
Glossary
- Confounders — other factors that could be the real cause, making cause-and-effect hard to prove.
- Essentialism / essentialize — treating a group as if it has one fixed “essence” (“women are X”), ignoring variation.
- Epiphenomenon — a byproduct; something that looks important but is really “exhaust” from a deeper cause.
- Monocausal — blaming one cause for a complex outcome.
- Pathology (institutional pathology) — a recurring dysfunctional pattern inside an institution.
- Prophylaxis — preventative action; here, pre-emptive “avoid scandal” behavior.
- Psychologizing — explaining political/institutional behavior by reducing it to personality traits or “mental makeup.”
A pocket field guide to the tells, the vibes, and the escape hatches 🧭
This one is deliberately not an essay. It’s a field guide. If “The Woke Machine” was the engine diagram and “The Woke Machine in the Wild” was the road test, this is the laminated card you keep in your purse/wallet so you can recognize the pattern in real time.
Rule of thumb: you’re not looking for left or right. You’re looking for a script. The woke script, as used in this series, shows up when a conversation shifts from “what’s true?” to “who gets to speak?” to “if you disagree, you’re guilty.”
The three-check test (10 seconds)
If you hear these three moves stacked together, you’ve found it:
- Identity first: “This is about who we are and what’s been done to us.”
- Standing first: “Some people speak; other people defer.”
- Sealed loop: “Disagreement proves the harm.”
One of these is normal politics. All three together is the machine.
The Field Guide Cards 📇
Each card has: vibe → what it’s doing → escape hatch
Card 1: The Credential Swap
Vibe: “It’s not my job to educate you.”
What it’s doing: Turns your question into an offense so the claim never has to be defended.
Escape hatch: “Fair. Point me to the best source you trust. I’ll read it, then we can discuss the claim and the remedy.”
Card 2: The Motive Trap
Vibe: “Intent doesn’t matter. Only impact matters.”
What it’s doing: Makes every mistake equally condemnable. Eliminates proportionality.
Escape hatch: “Impact matters. Intent matters for what response is fair. What change would satisfy you, and what would be excessive?”
Card 3: The Moral Draft Notice
Vibe: “Silence is violence.”
What it’s doing: Forces instant alignment. Neutrality becomes guilt.
Escape hatch: “I’m open to discussion. I don’t do coerced declarations.”
Card 4: The Sacred Testimony Upgrade
Vibe: “Listen to marginalized voices.”
What it’s doing: Sometimes an honest corrective. Sometimes a command to treat testimony as unquestionable.
Escape hatch: “I’m listening. After listening, are we allowed to test general claims with shared evidence standards?”
Card 5: Harm as a Veto
Vibe: “That’s harm.” / “That’s violence.”
What it’s doing: Replaces argument with a stop sign.
Escape hatch: “Let’s specify. What concrete harm, to whom, at what threshold, and what rule follows from it?”
Card 6: The Implementation Shaming
Vibe: “You’re centering yourself.”
What it’s doing: Turns practical questions into moral failure.
Escape hatch: “Implementation questions protect people from unintended damage. Let’s talk tradeoffs.”
Card 7: The Purity Shortcut
Vibe: “If you were a good person, you’d already agree.”
What it’s doing: Makes moral worth depend on agreement.
Escape hatch: “Good people disagree. Let’s talk reasons, evidence, and costs.”
Card 8: The Story-to-System Leap
Vibe: “My lived experience proves the system is X.”
What it’s doing: Jumps from testimony to total causation without the hard middle step.
Escape hatch: “I accept the experience. Now show how we know the cause. What alternative explanations did we check?”
Card 9: The Sealed Loop
Vibe: “Your disagreement is proof.”
What it’s doing: Objections become confirmation. Nothing can be corrected.
Escape hatch: “If disagreement counts as proof, we’ve left reasoning. What would count as disconfirming evidence?”
Card 10: The Reality Sabotage
Vibe: “Objectivity is a tool of oppression.”
What it’s doing: Undermines common standards so the frame can’t lose.
Escape hatch: “If we can’t share standards, we can’t make fair rules. What standards apply to everyone equally?”
Card 11: The Venue Laundering Move
Vibe: “Deplatforming isn’t censorship.”
What it’s doing: Uses technicalities to deny coercion while doing coercion.
Escape hatch: “Maybe it isn’t state censorship. It’s still a power move. What principle makes this consistent?”
Card 12: The Totalizing Story
Vibe: “The whole system is rigged.”
What it’s doing: Converts a hypothesis into a worldview. Every counterexample becomes cover-up.
Escape hatch: “Maybe. What evidence would make you revise that, and what would count as a genuine counterexample?”
The “Woke in the Wild” Bingo Strip 🎯
If you hear three of these in one conversation, slow down:
- “Do the work.”
- “That’s not up for debate.”
- “I don’t feel safe.” (used as policy veto)
- “Platforming equals harm.”
- “Your questions are violence.”
- “You’re asking for emotional labor.”
- “We can’t center comfort.”
- “The data is racist.”
- “That’s tone policing.”
- “You’re on the wrong side of history.”
Some of these are sometimes fair complaints. The tell is when they function as argument substitutes.
Three calm moves that work in almost any room 😌
- Falsifiability: “What would change your mind?”
- Symmetry: “Does this rule apply to your side too?”
- Category check: “Are we discussing evidence, or are we assigning moral status?”
You’re not trying to dunk. You’re trying to keep the conversation inside reality.
Mini-glossary (translation for normal humans) 📘
- Standing: who is treated as allowed to speak and be believed.
- Self-sealing: a belief that treats objections as confirmation.
- Moral sorting: dividing people into good/bad based on frame acceptance.
- Harm (as used here): sometimes real injury; sometimes a rhetorical stop sign.
- Deplatforming: removing access to a venue; not always illegal, often still coercive.
Endnote
This field guide simplifies the framework outlined in “The Woke Machine” and “The Woke Machine in the Wild” prompted by James Lindsay’s New Discourses discussion of “woke” as an identity-and-epistemology posture rather than a simple political label.
[This is second in an expository series on how “Woke” works, see here for the foundational essay on what woke is]
1) The claim
“Woke” is not a single policy or a stable tribe. It is a portable political form: a way of converting friction into identity, and identity into a special way of knowing.
A practical diagnostic:
- Ontological grievance: the dispute becomes about who we are and what is being done to us.
- Positional knowing: standing determines what can be known; dissent becomes suspect.
- Self-sealing loop: objections are reinterpreted as proof of corruption.
When those stack, persuasion decays into control-seeking.
2) The Left, steelmanned (and where the machine bites)
Start with the best version. There are reasonable claims on the Left:
- Institutions can have blind spots that matter in real lives.
- Listening to marginal voices can correct systematic inattention.
- Some norms exclude people unnecessarily, and reform can reduce that.
That’s ordinary liberal reform.
Machine activation begins when “correction” turns into “jurisdiction.” Disagreement becomes “harm,” procedural neutrality becomes “violence in disguise,” and the argument becomes uncorrectable because argument itself is reclassified as aggression.
You can see the pattern in soft-power settings where programming becomes legitimacy warfare. The Adelaide Writers’ Week / Randa Abdel-Fattah controversy escalated into resignations, withdrawals, cancellation, institutional apology, and a promised reinvitation. The conflict stopped being “who should speak” and became “who has moral authority to decide who speaks.” (ABC)
Now the policy-adjacent version (harder, more consequential): Canada’s Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act). Steelman: protecting people’s access to religious/cultural spaces from intimidation and addressing hate-motivated conduct are serious public-order aims. (Canada)
But the same machine-shaped risk appears in the surrounding rhetoric: once “speech boundary” disputes are treated as a moral sorting test (good people vs haters), it becomes harder to argue about scope, definitions, and safeguards without being read as suspect. Civil-liberties groups explicitly warn about Charter impacts and overreach risks. (CCLA)
The point is not “hate laws are woke.” The point is: when moral urgency turns into epistemic privilege, the debate stops being corrigible.
3) The Right, steelmanned (and where the machine bites)
Start with the best version. There are reasonable claims on the Right:
- Borders, civic trust, and state capacity matter.
- Institutions sometimes overreach and launder ideology through “neutral” language.
- Recent years have trained people to doubt official narratives too easily.
That is not conspiracism. It’s ordinary suspicion in a messy age.
Bridge sentence (the crucial distinction): distrust becomes machine-shaped when it flips into a total explanatory key, where suppression itself is treated as evidence of truth (“they don’t want you to know”), and disagreement is recoded as complicity.
That’s the turn that makes replacement-style narratives so sticky: anxiety about cohesion gets converted into a unified dispossession story with hidden directors. Watchdogs and explainer sources describe “Great Replacement” ideology as a white nationalist conspiracy frame, often with antisemitic variants, and as a driver for radicalization. (Al Jazeera)
(One more steelman note: people can argue about immigration levels, integration, and public confidence without endorsing any of that. The machine is not “caring about borders.” The machine is the sealed metaphysics move.)
4) Shared outputs (what the form produces on either side)
Once the form locks in, the outputs converge:
Friend–enemy sorting
People are judged less by arguments than by whether they accept the frame. “Ally” becomes an obedience category.
Exception ethics
Rules become “context.” Double standards become “justice.” Coercion becomes “self-defense.”
Platform war
Institutions become terrain: universities, HR offices, granting bodies, publishers, professional colleges.
A Canadian micro-case: the York University Student Centre dispute around MP Garnett Genuis shows how a procedural venue decision can become a symbolic censorship war, with different accounts emphasizing policy requirements versus ideological suppression. The ambiguity itself becomes fuel. (CityNews Edmonton)
5) The discriminator (reform vs machine)
Reform politics says: we can be wrong; show what would change our mind.
Machine politics says: disagreement proves you are contaminated.
That shift is the warning. Not that every Left claim is woke, or every Right claim is woke, but that any movement becomes uncorrigible once it adopts the form.
When that happens, societies stop arguing and start purging. 🧯
Glossary
- Ontological grievance: a complaint treated as core to being, not a fixable dispute.
- Positional knowing / standpoint: the view that social position determines access to truth; some “lived experience” claims function as trump cards.
- Self-sealing loop: a reasoning loop where objections become confirmation.
- Friend–enemy sorting: political classification that treats opponents as existential threats.
- Exception ethics: moral rules are suspended because “we’re under siege.”
- Platform war: institutions become the main battleground for power.
- Corrigible: open to correction by evidence and argument.
Endnotes
- James Lindsay, “What Woke Really Means” (New Discourses podcast, Jan 21, 2026).
- Adelaide Writers’ Week controversy: ABC coverage and Adelaide Festival statement (apology + 2027 reinvitation), plus reporting on cancellation after withdrawals. (ABC)
- Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act): Government summary + bill text; civil-liberties critiques and legal-professional analysis. (Canada)
- York University Student Centre / Garnett Genuis dispute (policy vs free-speech framing). (CityNews Edmonton)
- “Great Replacement” explainer coverage describing it as a conspiracy frame and discussing radicalization risk. (Al Jazeera)
Attribution: This essay is a paraphrase-and-critique prompted by James Lindsay’s New Discourses Podcast episode “What Woke Really Means.” Any errors of interpretation are mine. (New Discourses)
“Woke” is a word that now means everything and nothing: insult, badge, shibboleth, brand. That’s why it’s worth defining it narrowly before arguing about it. I’m not using “woke” to mean “progressive,” “civil-rights liberal,” “any activism,” or “anyone who thinks injustice exists.” I mean a specific machine: a moral–political pattern that turns social friction into group-based identity, and then turns group-based identity into a special way of knowing. When that pattern is present, the downstream politics are unusually predictable.
The first engine is entitlement turned into alienation. Start with a felt ought: people like me should be able to live, speak, belong, succeed, and be recognized in a certain way. That ought can be reasonable. Some groups really have been locked out of full participation. Institutions really do gatekeep. Norms really do punish outsiders. The pivot is what you do with the mismatch between “ought” and reality. The woke machine teaches that the mismatch is not mainly a mix of tradeoffs, chance, imperfect policy, individual bad actors, or local failures. It is alienation, a structural condition imposed by an illegitimate power arrangement. Your frustration is not merely about outcomes. It becomes about being denied your proper mode of existence. Once alienation is framed that way, it stops being a problem to solve and becomes an identity to inhabit.
That identity shift is the real move. The self is quietly demoted from “individual with rights and duties” to “representative of a class in conflict.” You begin to think in group nouns first: oppressed/oppressor, marginalized/privileged, normal/deviant, colonized/colonizer. This is why identity politics shows up so reliably. It is a downstream output of a prior decision to interpret the world through group-alienation. It can even masquerade as humility. “I’m just listening to marginalized voices.” But it performs a different operation. Moral standing relocates from argument to position. You don’t merely hold beliefs. You become a bearer of a collective grievance, and that grievance grants a kind of authority in advance.
The second engine is epistemic: knowledge becomes positional. Again, the starting observation can be true enough. Institutions reward certain ways of speaking. Credentialing filters who gets heard. Consensus is sometimes wrong. Lived experience can surface facts that statistics miss. The woke machine turns those observations into a total explanation. The established “knowing field” is not just fallible, but hegemonic. It is treated as a knowledge regime that functions to protect power.
There is an honest version of this impulse. Marginalized people can notice things insiders miss. Testimony can expose local abuses that institutions quietly normalize. Suspicion of official narratives is sometimes warranted. History is full of respectable consensus that later looks like rationalized cruelty. In that sense, privileging marginalized voices can function as a corrective. The problem begins when “corrective” hardens into a standing hierarchy of credibility, and when the moral value of hearing becomes a substitute for the epistemic work of checking. At that point, the method stops being a tool for truth and becomes a tool for power.
Once you accept the hegemonic frame as total, a standing preference follows. “Counter-hegemonic” claims, those said to come from the margins or said to be suppressed, are treated as inherently more trustworthy, or at least more morally protected. The point isn’t always truth. Often it’s leverage. If a claim destabilizes the legitimacy of the system, it gets treated as epistemically special.
You can see how this becomes self-sealing. Consider a common pattern: demographic observation, then a moralized system interpretation, then an appeal to lived experience, then immunity from counterargument. “I notice a space is mostly white.” Fine. “Therefore hiking is racist.” That is not observation but diagnosis. If challenged, the claim can retreat into experience: “I feel unsafe,” “my lived experience says otherwise.” Any dissent is then reclassified as proof of the system’s blindness. The disagreement is not processed as information. It becomes further evidence of hegemony. At that point, you’re no longer arguing about the world. You’re litigating the moral status of who gets to describe it.
Put these two engines together, alienation-as-identity and positional knowing, and the political outputs stop looking like random bad behavior. If your group’s situation is existential, ordinary ethics begin to look like luxuries written by your enemy. Double standards don’t feel like hypocrisy. They feel like “context.” Coercive tactics don’t feel like power-seeking. They feel like self-defense. “Allies” become morally sorted people who accept the frame. “Enemies” become those who refuse it. Because the machine treats knowledge as power, controlling speech and institutions can be rationalized as protecting truth rather than enforcing conformity.
So here’s a clean diagnostic that avoids cheap mind-reading. It’s not “woke” to notice injustice, organize, protest, or advocate. It becomes woke in this sense when three conditions appear together:
- Ontological grievance: your primary identity is a group-based injury story. Who you are is mainly who harmed “your people.”
- Positional epistemology: the status of a claim depends heavily on who says it, not what can be shown. Identity outranks argument.
- Self-sealing reasoning: disagreement is treated as proof of harm or hegemony, making correction impossible.
Any one of these can show up in ordinary politics. “Woke,” in this narrow sense, is when they lock together and become a stable identity system.
That triad is the machine. Once it’s operating, it tends to erode the conditions that let pluralistic societies function: shared standards of evidence, equal moral agency, and the ability to disagree without being treated as morally contaminated. In its best moments, the impulse can push institutions to see what they ignored and to repair what they excused. But a politics that begins as reform can slide into a politics that needs conflict as fuel. Once conflict becomes fuel, the temptation is obvious. Keep the wound open. Keep the epistemic gate locked. Keep the enemy permanent. If the machine ever stops, the identity it built starts to dissolve. 🔥
Glossary 📘
Alienation
A felt separation from what you believe you should rightfully be or have. In this framework: not mere disappointment, but a condition allegedly imposed by an illegitimate system.
Entitlement claim
A “felt ought”: a belief that people like me (or my group) are owed a certain kind of recognition, access, or outcome. Not automatically “spoiled,” just the moral premise that something is due.
Group-based identity
A primary self-concept built around membership in a social category (race/sex/class/nation, etc.), especially when that category is framed as locked in conflict with another.
Identity politics
Politics organized primarily around group membership and group conflict rather than individual rights, shared citizenship, or policy compromise.
Ontology / ontological grievance
Ontology is “what you are.” Ontological grievance is when grievance becomes core to being: the self is primarily defined as an injured member of an alienated group.
Epistemology / positional epistemology
Epistemology is “how we know.” Positional epistemology is when the credibility of claims depends heavily on the speaker’s identity position, rather than evidence and argument.
Hegemony / hegemonic knowledge
The idea that a society’s “common sense” and official knowledge are shaped to preserve existing power. “Hegemonic knowledge” is what the system allegedly allows as legitimate truth.
Counter-hegemonic / marginalized claims
Claims presented as outside the dominant “knowing field,” often treated as morally protected or more trustworthy because they challenge the status quo.
Lived experience
First-person testimony about what life is like. Valuable as evidence of experience; controversial when treated as unquestionable authority on broad causal explanations.
Self-sealing reasoning
A reasoning pattern where counterevidence is reinterpreted as evidence for the claim (for example, “your disagreement proves the system’s bias”), making the claim hard to correct.
Friend–enemy politics
A posture that sorts people into allies and enemies in a moralized way, where dissent feels like threat rather than disagreement.
Exception ethics
A moral logic where ordinary standards like fairness, consistency, and procedural restraint are suspended because the situation is framed as existential.
Endnotes
- James Lindsay, “What Woke Really Means,” New Discourses Podcast (New Discourses, January 21, 2026). (New Discourses)
- “What Woke Really Means,” New Discourses (audio hosting/episode metadata). (SoundCloud)
- Joe L. Kincheloe, Critical Constructivism Primer (Peter Lang, 2005). (Peter Lang)
- Özlem Sensoy and Robin DiAngelo, Is Everyone Really Equal? An Introduction to Key Concepts in Social Justice Education, 2nd ed. (Teachers College Press, 2017). (tcpress.com)
- Helen Pluckrose and James A. Lindsay, Cynical Theories: How Activist Scholarship Made Everything About Race, Gender, and Identity—and Why This Harms Everybody (Pitchstone Publishing, 2020). (ipgbook.com)
Canada is in the middle of a familiar temptation: the Americans are difficult, therefore the Chinese offer must be sane.
The immediate backdrop is concrete. On January 16, 2026, Canada announced a reset in economic ties with China that includes lowering barriers for a set number of Chinese EVs, while China reduces tariffs on key Canadian exports like canola. (Reuters) Washington responded with open irritation, warning Canada it may regret the move and stressing Chinese EVs will face U.S. barriers. (Reuters)
If you want a simple, pasteable bromide for people losing their minds online, it’s this: the U.S. and China both do bad things, but they do bad things in different ways, at different scales, with different “escape hatches.” One is a democracy with adversarial institutions that sometimes work. The other is a one-party state that treats accountability as a threat.
To make that visible, here are five egregious “hits” from each—then the contrast that actually matters.
Five things the United States does that Canadians have reason to resent
1) Protectionist trade punishment against allies
Steel/aluminum tariffs and recurring lumber duties are the classic pattern: national-interest rhetoric, domestic political payoff, allied collateral damage. Canada has repeatedly challenged U.S. measures on steel/aluminum and softwood lumber. (Global Affairs Canada)
Takeaway: the U.S. will squeeze Canada when it’s convenient—sometimes loudly, sometimes as a bureaucratic grind.
2) Energy and infrastructure whiplash
Keystone XL is the poster child of U.S. policy reversals that impose real costs north of the border and then move on. The project’s termination is documented by the company and Canadian/Alberta sources. (TC Energy)
Takeaway: the U.S. can treat Canadian capital as disposable when U.S. domestic politics flips.
3) Extraterritorial reach into Canadians’ private financial lives
FATCA and related information-sharing arrangements are widely experienced as a sovereignty irritant (and have been litigated in Canada). The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately declined to hear a constitutional challenge in 2023. (STEP)
Takeaway: the U.S. often assumes its laws get to follow people across borders.
4) A surveillance state that had to be restrained after the fact
Bulk telephone metadata collection under Patriot Act authorities became politically toxic and was later reformed/ended under the USA Freedom Act’s structure. (Default)
Takeaway: democracies can drift into overreach; the difference is that overreach can become a scandal, a law change, and a court fight.
5) The post-9/11 stain: indefinite detention and coercive interrogation
Guantánamo’s long-running controversy and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s reporting on the CIA program remain enduring examples of U.S. moral failure. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
Takeaway: the U.S. is capable of serious rights abuses—then also capable of documenting them publicly, litigating them, and partially reversing course.
Five things the People’s Republic of China does that are categorically different
1) Mass rights violations against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang
The UN human rights office assessed serious human rights concerns in Xinjiang and noted that the scale of certain detention practices may constitute international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Canada has publicly echoed those concerns in multilateral statements. (OHCHR)
Takeaway: this is not “policy disagreement.” It’s a regime-scale human rights problem.
2) Hong Kong: the model of “one country, one party”
The ongoing use of the national security framework to prosecute prominent pro-democracy figures is a live, observable indicator of how Beijing treats dissent when it has full jurisdiction. (Reuters)
Takeaway: when Beijing says “stability,” it means obedience.
3) Foreign interference and transnational pressure tactics
Canadian public safety materials and parliamentary reporting describe investigations into transnational repression activity and concerns around “overseas police stations” and foreign influence. (Public Safety Canada)
Takeaway: the Chinese state’s threat model can extend into diaspora communities abroad.
4) Systematic acquisition—licit and illicit—of sensitive technology and IP
The U.S. intelligence community’s public threat assessment explicitly describes China’s efforts to accelerate S&T progress through licit and illicit means, including IP acquisition/theft and cyber operations. (Director of National Intelligence)
Takeaway: your “market partner” may also be running an extraction strategy against your innovation base.
5) Environmental and maritime predation at scale
China remains a dominant player in coal buildout even while expanding renewables, a dual-track strategy with global climate implications. (Financial Times)
On the oceans, multiple research and advocacy reports emphasize the size and global footprint of China’s distant-water fishing and associated IUU concerns. (Brookings)
Takeaway: when the state backs extraction, the externalities get exported.
Compare and contrast: the difference is accountability
If you read those lists and conclude “both sides are bad,” you’ve missed the key variable.
The U.S. does bad things in a system with adversarial leak paths:
investigative journalism, courts, opposition parties, congressional reports, and leadership turnover. That doesn’t prevent abuses. It does make abuses contestable—and sometimes reversible. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
China does bad things in a system designed to prevent contestation:
one-party rule, censorship, legal instruments aimed at “subversion,” and a governance style that treats independent scrutiny as hostile action. The problem isn’t “China is foreign.” The problem is that the regime’s incentives run against transparency by design. (Reuters)
So when someone says, “Maybe we should pivot away from the Americans,” the adult response is:
- Yes, diversify.
- No, don’t pretend dependency on an authoritarian state is merely a swap of suppliers.
A quick media-literacy rule for your feed
If a post uses a checklist like “America did X, therefore China is fine,” it’s usually laundering a conclusion.
A better frame is risk profile:
- In a democracy, policy risk is high but visible—and the country can change its mind in public.
- In a one-party state, policy risk is lower until it isn’t—and then you discover the rules were never meant to protect you.
Canada can do business with anyone. But it should not confuse trade with trust, or frustration with Washington with safety in Beijing.
If Canada wants autonomy, the answer isn’t romanticizing China. It’s building a broader portfolio across countries where the rule of law is not a slogan in a press release.
References
- Canada–China trade reset (EV tariffs/canola): Reuters; Guardian. (Reuters)
- U.S. criticism of Canada opening to Chinese EVs: Reuters. (Reuters)
- U.S. tariffs/lumber disputes: Global Affairs Canada; Reuters. (Global Affairs Canada)
- Keystone XL termination: TC Energy; Government of Alberta. (TC Energy)
- FATCA Canadian challenge result: STEP (re Supreme Court dismissal). (STEP)
- USA Freedom Act / end of bulk metadata: Lawfare; Just Security. (Default)
- CIA detention/interrogation report: U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report PDF. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
- Guantánamo context: Reuters; Amnesty. (Reuters)
- Xinjiang assessment: OHCHR report + Canada multilateral statement. (OHCHR)
- Hong Kong NSL crackdown example: Reuters (Jimmy Lai). (Reuters)
- Transnational repression / overseas police station concerns: Public Safety Canada; House of Commons report PDF. (Public Safety Canada)
- China tech acquisition / IP theft framing: ODNI Annual Threat Assessment PDF. (Director of National Intelligence)
- Coal buildout: Financial Times; Reuters analysis. (Financial Times)
- Distant-water fishing footprint / IUU concerns: Brookings; EJF; Oceana. (Brookings)
The Federal Court of Appeal’s January 16, 2026 decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association (2026 FCA 6) is not a cultural commentary on the Freedom Convoy. It is a narrower—and more consequential—statement about threshold: what must be true before the federal executive can lawfully reach for extraordinary powers.
The Court’s conclusion is unambiguous: “every appeal before this Court should be dismissed.” It affirms that “the declaration of a public order emergency was unreasonable,” and it adopts the word that matters in a rule-of-law system: “ultra vires.” It also states that “parts of the Regulations and Economic Order infringed paragraph 2(b) and section 8 of the Charter.” That is the spine of the judgment. Everything else is the anatomy supporting it.
What happened, in the Court’s own framing
The decision “results from the Proclamation Declaring a Public Order Emergency … issued … on February 14, 2022,” declaring “reasonable grounds to believe a public order emergency existed under subsection 17(1),” followed by “Emergency Measures Regulations” and the “Emergency Economic Measures Order” on February 15, 2022. Those instruments were deployed in the midst of what “came to be known as the ‘Freedom Convoy 2022’,” as “hundreds of vehicles” converged on Ottawa, alongside “a number of border blockades,” including the “Sweetgrass-Coutts, Alberta border crossing” and the “Ambassador Bridge.”
The Court also records the litigation path. On January 29, 2024, the Federal Court found “the reasons provided for the decision to declare a public order emergency did not satisfy the requirements” of the Act, and that some temporary measures “infringed section 8 and paragraph 2(b) … and were not justified under section 1.” The Attorney General appealed those findings; civil-liberties groups cross-appealed on peaceful assembly. The Federal Court of Appeal’s answer to the main question—was the invocation lawful and reasonable?—is no.
“Last resort” is not a slogan; it is a constraint
The most useful line in this decision is not a flourish. It is an instruction.
The Federal Court (quoted and endorsed in the appellate reasons) states: “Due to its nature and to the broad powers it grants the Federal Executive, the Emergencies Act is a tool of last resort. The GIC cannot invoke the Emergencies Act because it is convenient, or because it may work better than other tools at their disposal or available to the provinces.” It then ties that principle to factual assessment: “the evidence is clear that the majority of the provinces were able to deal with the situation using other federal law, such as the Criminal Code, and their own legislation.”
That pair of sentences does the real work. It rejects the idea—common in crisis politics—that “better” justifies “exceptional.” It anchors emergency powers to necessity, not preference.
The Court of Appeal adds a helpful nuance later: while the Act is “meant to be an instrument of last resort,” it “cannot be construed as a straitjacket” that forces Cabinet to exhaust every imaginable legal tool before acting. But that is not a concession to improvisation. It is a warning that the reasoning still has to be there, and it still has to meet “exacting” statutory demands.
Evidence, not atmosphere: “compelling and credible information”
A second throughline runs alongside “last resort”: the requirement that the executive’s belief be anchored in something sturdier than fear, political pressure, or generalized disorder.
The Court states the prerequisite in crisp terms: “the GIC must have reasonable grounds to believe, based on compelling and credible information, that threats to the security of Canada as described in section 2 of the CSIS Act existed.” And then it drops the verdict: “this evidence was lacking here.”
This is where the decision becomes a rebuke rather than a mere disagreement.
The Court rejects the attempt to stretch the statutory trigger to match the government’s policy urgency. It insists, “For the time being, we must take the Act as it reads, and not as the AGC would like it to read.” And it draws a sharp boundary around the phrase doing much of the litigation’s heavy lifting: “It would stretch beyond rationality the meaning of the words ‘serious violence’ … if they were to encompass purely economic consequences or speculative disruption of essential goods and services.”
That is a judicial way of saying: you don’t get to expand the fuse because you prefer the explosion.
When it turns to violence, the Court is equally direct. It notes that “the evidence is quite simply lacking” for serious violence against persons; and that, aside from the economic disturbance, “the only incident of violence put forward by the AGC was the seizure of a cache of firearms and ammunition at Coutts, as well as vague reports” of harassment, intimidation, and assault, plus the fact that Ottawa police were overwhelmed. “In our view, this is insufficient” to meet the “compelling and credible information” requirement for reasonable grounds.
Even where the protests were “disturbing and disruptive,” the Court concludes “they fell well short of a threat to national security.” It notes that this was “borne out by CSIS’s own threat assessment,” and it flags that an alternative assessment was requested but the Act was invoked “before it was completed.”
The implication is not subtle: emergency powers require proof-grade reasoning at the time of decision, not post-hoc narrative scaffolding.
Charter impacts: expression and financial measures
On expression, the Court endorses the Federal Court’s findings as to overbreadth and unjustified limits. It records that “the Regulations were overbroad to the extent that they criminalized the entire protest,” and that “the freedom of expression of peaceful protestors who did not participate in the actions of those disrupting the peace was infringed.” The appellate court’s own conclusion at the front end of the reasons affirms that “parts of the Regulations and Economic Order infringed paragraph 2(b) and section 8 of the Charter.”
It also disposes of the peaceful assembly cross-appeal without enlarging the rights analysis: “We are satisfied that the paragraph 2(b) infringement sufficiently accounts for the related right to assemble under paragraph 2(c), and decline to address the cross-appeal.”
On the financial measures, the Court’s concern is about sweeping power paired with loose identification and weak safeguards. It calls out “the lack of rigour contemplated in identifying individuals” who may have been subject to information-sharing provisions. Then it names the operational hazard bluntly: “The suggestion that financial institutions may have been expected to rely on information they obtained from news or social media reports or the internet … is troubling in the extreme.”
That line will survive because it captures a broader institutional truth: when the state deputizes private actors into enforcement, the state inherits the private actor’s epistemic sloppiness—unless it builds guardrails. The Court is signaling that the guardrails were not proportionate to the power.
What this decision changes (and what it doesn’t)
This judgment doesn’t settle the political argument about 2022. It does something more important: it narrows the legal escape hatch for future governments.
It teaches three lessons that will matter the next time Ottawa faces a sprawling, ugly, high-pressure public disorder:
- “Last resort” means necessity, not superiority. “Convenient” and “works better” are not lawful triggers.
- Economic harm is not a magic synonym for statutory violence thresholds. If Parliament wrote “serious violence,” courts will not applaud a creative rewrite.
- Extraordinary powers demand evidentiary discipline and procedural safeguards that can withstand sunlight. “Troubling in the extreme” is what happens when you skip that.
If the government seeks further appeal, the next stage will likely fight over deference, evidentiary sufficiency, and how “exacting” the threshold must be under real-time stress. But the shape of the precedent is already clear: the Act is not a general-purpose crisis broom. It is a weapon with a trigger guard, and the Court has just tightened the guard.
References
- Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2026 FCA 6 (Federal Court of Appeal, judgment delivered January 16, 2026; PDF).
- Justice Laws Website, Emergencies Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.); enactment note “[1988, c. 29, assented to 21st July, 1988]”). (Department of Justice Canada)
- The Canadian Encyclopedia, “War Measures Act” (notes repeal in 1988 and replacement by the Emergencies Act). (The Canadian Encyclopedia)
- Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC), Order in Council P.C. 2022-392 (April 25, 2022) and POEC site summary of establishment. (publicorderemergencycommission.ca)
bleatmop
Mystro
The Arbourist
Dead Wild Roses 
Your opinions…