You are currently browsing the category archive for the ‘Canada’ category.
Canada is in the middle of a familiar temptation: the Americans are difficult, therefore the Chinese offer must be sane.
The immediate backdrop is concrete. On January 16, 2026, Canada announced a reset in economic ties with China that includes lowering barriers for a set number of Chinese EVs, while China reduces tariffs on key Canadian exports like canola. (Reuters) Washington responded with open irritation, warning Canada it may regret the move and stressing Chinese EVs will face U.S. barriers. (Reuters)
If you want a simple, pasteable bromide for people losing their minds online, it’s this: the U.S. and China both do bad things, but they do bad things in different ways, at different scales, with different “escape hatches.” One is a democracy with adversarial institutions that sometimes work. The other is a one-party state that treats accountability as a threat.
To make that visible, here are five egregious “hits” from each—then the contrast that actually matters.
Five things the United States does that Canadians have reason to resent
1) Protectionist trade punishment against allies
Steel/aluminum tariffs and recurring lumber duties are the classic pattern: national-interest rhetoric, domestic political payoff, allied collateral damage. Canada has repeatedly challenged U.S. measures on steel/aluminum and softwood lumber. (Global Affairs Canada)
Takeaway: the U.S. will squeeze Canada when it’s convenient—sometimes loudly, sometimes as a bureaucratic grind.
2) Energy and infrastructure whiplash
Keystone XL is the poster child of U.S. policy reversals that impose real costs north of the border and then move on. The project’s termination is documented by the company and Canadian/Alberta sources. (TC Energy)
Takeaway: the U.S. can treat Canadian capital as disposable when U.S. domestic politics flips.
3) Extraterritorial reach into Canadians’ private financial lives
FATCA and related information-sharing arrangements are widely experienced as a sovereignty irritant (and have been litigated in Canada). The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately declined to hear a constitutional challenge in 2023. (STEP)
Takeaway: the U.S. often assumes its laws get to follow people across borders.
4) A surveillance state that had to be restrained after the fact
Bulk telephone metadata collection under Patriot Act authorities became politically toxic and was later reformed/ended under the USA Freedom Act’s structure. (Default)
Takeaway: democracies can drift into overreach; the difference is that overreach can become a scandal, a law change, and a court fight.
5) The post-9/11 stain: indefinite detention and coercive interrogation
Guantánamo’s long-running controversy and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s reporting on the CIA program remain enduring examples of U.S. moral failure. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
Takeaway: the U.S. is capable of serious rights abuses—then also capable of documenting them publicly, litigating them, and partially reversing course.
Five things the People’s Republic of China does that are categorically different
1) Mass rights violations against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang
The UN human rights office assessed serious human rights concerns in Xinjiang and noted that the scale of certain detention practices may constitute international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Canada has publicly echoed those concerns in multilateral statements. (OHCHR)
Takeaway: this is not “policy disagreement.” It’s a regime-scale human rights problem.
2) Hong Kong: the model of “one country, one party”
The ongoing use of the national security framework to prosecute prominent pro-democracy figures is a live, observable indicator of how Beijing treats dissent when it has full jurisdiction. (Reuters)
Takeaway: when Beijing says “stability,” it means obedience.
3) Foreign interference and transnational pressure tactics
Canadian public safety materials and parliamentary reporting describe investigations into transnational repression activity and concerns around “overseas police stations” and foreign influence. (Public Safety Canada)
Takeaway: the Chinese state’s threat model can extend into diaspora communities abroad.
4) Systematic acquisition—licit and illicit—of sensitive technology and IP
The U.S. intelligence community’s public threat assessment explicitly describes China’s efforts to accelerate S&T progress through licit and illicit means, including IP acquisition/theft and cyber operations. (Director of National Intelligence)
Takeaway: your “market partner” may also be running an extraction strategy against your innovation base.
5) Environmental and maritime predation at scale
China remains a dominant player in coal buildout even while expanding renewables, a dual-track strategy with global climate implications. (Financial Times)
On the oceans, multiple research and advocacy reports emphasize the size and global footprint of China’s distant-water fishing and associated IUU concerns. (Brookings)
Takeaway: when the state backs extraction, the externalities get exported.
Compare and contrast: the difference is accountability
If you read those lists and conclude “both sides are bad,” you’ve missed the key variable.
The U.S. does bad things in a system with adversarial leak paths:
investigative journalism, courts, opposition parties, congressional reports, and leadership turnover. That doesn’t prevent abuses. It does make abuses contestable—and sometimes reversible. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
China does bad things in a system designed to prevent contestation:
one-party rule, censorship, legal instruments aimed at “subversion,” and a governance style that treats independent scrutiny as hostile action. The problem isn’t “China is foreign.” The problem is that the regime’s incentives run against transparency by design. (Reuters)
So when someone says, “Maybe we should pivot away from the Americans,” the adult response is:
- Yes, diversify.
- No, don’t pretend dependency on an authoritarian state is merely a swap of suppliers.
A quick media-literacy rule for your feed
If a post uses a checklist like “America did X, therefore China is fine,” it’s usually laundering a conclusion.
A better frame is risk profile:
- In a democracy, policy risk is high but visible—and the country can change its mind in public.
- In a one-party state, policy risk is lower until it isn’t—and then you discover the rules were never meant to protect you.
Canada can do business with anyone. But it should not confuse trade with trust, or frustration with Washington with safety in Beijing.
If Canada wants autonomy, the answer isn’t romanticizing China. It’s building a broader portfolio across countries where the rule of law is not a slogan in a press release.
References
- Canada–China trade reset (EV tariffs/canola): Reuters; Guardian. (Reuters)
- U.S. criticism of Canada opening to Chinese EVs: Reuters. (Reuters)
- U.S. tariffs/lumber disputes: Global Affairs Canada; Reuters. (Global Affairs Canada)
- Keystone XL termination: TC Energy; Government of Alberta. (TC Energy)
- FATCA Canadian challenge result: STEP (re Supreme Court dismissal). (STEP)
- USA Freedom Act / end of bulk metadata: Lawfare; Just Security. (Default)
- CIA detention/interrogation report: U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report PDF. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
- Guantánamo context: Reuters; Amnesty. (Reuters)
- Xinjiang assessment: OHCHR report + Canada multilateral statement. (OHCHR)
- Hong Kong NSL crackdown example: Reuters (Jimmy Lai). (Reuters)
- Transnational repression / overseas police station concerns: Public Safety Canada; House of Commons report PDF. (Public Safety Canada)
- China tech acquisition / IP theft framing: ODNI Annual Threat Assessment PDF. (Director of National Intelligence)
- Coal buildout: Financial Times; Reuters analysis. (Financial Times)
- Distant-water fishing footprint / IUU concerns: Brookings; EJF; Oceana. (Brookings)
The Federal Court of Appeal’s January 16, 2026 decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association (2026 FCA 6) is not a cultural commentary on the Freedom Convoy. It is a narrower—and more consequential—statement about threshold: what must be true before the federal executive can lawfully reach for extraordinary powers.
The Court’s conclusion is unambiguous: “every appeal before this Court should be dismissed.” It affirms that “the declaration of a public order emergency was unreasonable,” and it adopts the word that matters in a rule-of-law system: “ultra vires.” It also states that “parts of the Regulations and Economic Order infringed paragraph 2(b) and section 8 of the Charter.” That is the spine of the judgment. Everything else is the anatomy supporting it.
What happened, in the Court’s own framing
The decision “results from the Proclamation Declaring a Public Order Emergency … issued … on February 14, 2022,” declaring “reasonable grounds to believe a public order emergency existed under subsection 17(1),” followed by “Emergency Measures Regulations” and the “Emergency Economic Measures Order” on February 15, 2022. Those instruments were deployed in the midst of what “came to be known as the ‘Freedom Convoy 2022’,” as “hundreds of vehicles” converged on Ottawa, alongside “a number of border blockades,” including the “Sweetgrass-Coutts, Alberta border crossing” and the “Ambassador Bridge.”
The Court also records the litigation path. On January 29, 2024, the Federal Court found “the reasons provided for the decision to declare a public order emergency did not satisfy the requirements” of the Act, and that some temporary measures “infringed section 8 and paragraph 2(b) … and were not justified under section 1.” The Attorney General appealed those findings; civil-liberties groups cross-appealed on peaceful assembly. The Federal Court of Appeal’s answer to the main question—was the invocation lawful and reasonable?—is no.
“Last resort” is not a slogan; it is a constraint
The most useful line in this decision is not a flourish. It is an instruction.
The Federal Court (quoted and endorsed in the appellate reasons) states: “Due to its nature and to the broad powers it grants the Federal Executive, the Emergencies Act is a tool of last resort. The GIC cannot invoke the Emergencies Act because it is convenient, or because it may work better than other tools at their disposal or available to the provinces.” It then ties that principle to factual assessment: “the evidence is clear that the majority of the provinces were able to deal with the situation using other federal law, such as the Criminal Code, and their own legislation.”
That pair of sentences does the real work. It rejects the idea—common in crisis politics—that “better” justifies “exceptional.” It anchors emergency powers to necessity, not preference.
The Court of Appeal adds a helpful nuance later: while the Act is “meant to be an instrument of last resort,” it “cannot be construed as a straitjacket” that forces Cabinet to exhaust every imaginable legal tool before acting. But that is not a concession to improvisation. It is a warning that the reasoning still has to be there, and it still has to meet “exacting” statutory demands.
Evidence, not atmosphere: “compelling and credible information”
A second throughline runs alongside “last resort”: the requirement that the executive’s belief be anchored in something sturdier than fear, political pressure, or generalized disorder.
The Court states the prerequisite in crisp terms: “the GIC must have reasonable grounds to believe, based on compelling and credible information, that threats to the security of Canada as described in section 2 of the CSIS Act existed.” And then it drops the verdict: “this evidence was lacking here.”
This is where the decision becomes a rebuke rather than a mere disagreement.
The Court rejects the attempt to stretch the statutory trigger to match the government’s policy urgency. It insists, “For the time being, we must take the Act as it reads, and not as the AGC would like it to read.” And it draws a sharp boundary around the phrase doing much of the litigation’s heavy lifting: “It would stretch beyond rationality the meaning of the words ‘serious violence’ … if they were to encompass purely economic consequences or speculative disruption of essential goods and services.”
That is a judicial way of saying: you don’t get to expand the fuse because you prefer the explosion.
When it turns to violence, the Court is equally direct. It notes that “the evidence is quite simply lacking” for serious violence against persons; and that, aside from the economic disturbance, “the only incident of violence put forward by the AGC was the seizure of a cache of firearms and ammunition at Coutts, as well as vague reports” of harassment, intimidation, and assault, plus the fact that Ottawa police were overwhelmed. “In our view, this is insufficient” to meet the “compelling and credible information” requirement for reasonable grounds.
Even where the protests were “disturbing and disruptive,” the Court concludes “they fell well short of a threat to national security.” It notes that this was “borne out by CSIS’s own threat assessment,” and it flags that an alternative assessment was requested but the Act was invoked “before it was completed.”
The implication is not subtle: emergency powers require proof-grade reasoning at the time of decision, not post-hoc narrative scaffolding.
Charter impacts: expression and financial measures
On expression, the Court endorses the Federal Court’s findings as to overbreadth and unjustified limits. It records that “the Regulations were overbroad to the extent that they criminalized the entire protest,” and that “the freedom of expression of peaceful protestors who did not participate in the actions of those disrupting the peace was infringed.” The appellate court’s own conclusion at the front end of the reasons affirms that “parts of the Regulations and Economic Order infringed paragraph 2(b) and section 8 of the Charter.”
It also disposes of the peaceful assembly cross-appeal without enlarging the rights analysis: “We are satisfied that the paragraph 2(b) infringement sufficiently accounts for the related right to assemble under paragraph 2(c), and decline to address the cross-appeal.”
On the financial measures, the Court’s concern is about sweeping power paired with loose identification and weak safeguards. It calls out “the lack of rigour contemplated in identifying individuals” who may have been subject to information-sharing provisions. Then it names the operational hazard bluntly: “The suggestion that financial institutions may have been expected to rely on information they obtained from news or social media reports or the internet … is troubling in the extreme.”
That line will survive because it captures a broader institutional truth: when the state deputizes private actors into enforcement, the state inherits the private actor’s epistemic sloppiness—unless it builds guardrails. The Court is signaling that the guardrails were not proportionate to the power.
What this decision changes (and what it doesn’t)
This judgment doesn’t settle the political argument about 2022. It does something more important: it narrows the legal escape hatch for future governments.
It teaches three lessons that will matter the next time Ottawa faces a sprawling, ugly, high-pressure public disorder:
- “Last resort” means necessity, not superiority. “Convenient” and “works better” are not lawful triggers.
- Economic harm is not a magic synonym for statutory violence thresholds. If Parliament wrote “serious violence,” courts will not applaud a creative rewrite.
- Extraordinary powers demand evidentiary discipline and procedural safeguards that can withstand sunlight. “Troubling in the extreme” is what happens when you skip that.
If the government seeks further appeal, the next stage will likely fight over deference, evidentiary sufficiency, and how “exacting” the threshold must be under real-time stress. But the shape of the precedent is already clear: the Act is not a general-purpose crisis broom. It is a weapon with a trigger guard, and the Court has just tightened the guard.
References
- Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 2026 FCA 6 (Federal Court of Appeal, judgment delivered January 16, 2026; PDF).
- Justice Laws Website, Emergencies Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.); enactment note “[1988, c. 29, assented to 21st July, 1988]”). (Department of Justice Canada)
- The Canadian Encyclopedia, “War Measures Act” (notes repeal in 1988 and replacement by the Emergencies Act). (The Canadian Encyclopedia)
- Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC), Order in Council P.C. 2022-392 (April 25, 2022) and POEC site summary of establishment. (publicorderemergencycommission.ca)
Suicidal empathy is a term Dr. Gad Saad uses to describe a specific failure mode of compassion: empathy that gets detached from boundaries, reciprocity, and cost-accounting—until it starts producing outcomes that harm the very people and institutions doing the empathizing.
Read it less as a diagnosis and more as a warning label. Empathy is normally a pro-social tool. It helps humans cooperate, care for dependents, and build trust. But like any tool, it can be misapplied. When empathy becomes an unconditional rule (“the compassionate option must always win”), it stops asking the questions that keep compassion functional: Who pays? Who benefits? What incentives are we creating? What happens if this scales?
That’s the central mechanism. Unbounded empathy deactivates trade-offs. It treats limits as moral failure, and it treats enforcement as cruelty. In public life, that often looks like policies designed around the needs of the claimant while steadily eroding the duties owed to the steward—the taxpayer, the law-abiding neighbor, the already-vulnerable person living downstream of disorder. It isn’t that compassion is wrong; it’s that compassion without accounting becomes a transfer of risk onto the conscientious.
If you want this concept to be useful—rather than partisan—you need a clean heuristic. Here’s one:
The Suicidal Empathy Test (a quick diagnostic)
When you see a “compassion-first” policy, norm, or movement, ask:
-
Where does the cost land?
Is the cost paid by decision-makers, or exported onto people with less voice? -
What happens at scale?
Would this still work if adopted widely, or is it only viable as a boutique exception? -
What incentives does it create?
Does it reward responsibility and reciprocity—or does it reward manipulation, noncompliance, or repeat harm? -
Are boundaries being treated as immoral by definition?
If the only “good” option is the one that refuses limits, you’re not doing ethics—you’re doing sentiment. -
Does it erode the conditions that make generosity possible?
High-trust societies can afford softness because they still enforce norms. If the proposal weakens trust, safety, or shared obligation, it may be burning the fuel empathy runs on.
You don’t need cynicism to apply this test. You just need the willingness to treat compassion as something that must be paired with responsibility. The point isn’t to feel less—it’s to see more: the second-order effects, the incentives, the people who silently pay. If empathy can’t survive contact with those questions, it isn’t moral courage. It’s moral vanity with a body count.
References
Suicidal Empathy (publisher page – HarperCollins / Broadside Books)
https://www.harpercollins.com/products/suicidal-empathy-gad-saad
Gad Saad – Concordia University faculty profile
https://www.concordia.ca/faculty/gad-saad.html
The Parasitic Mind (publisher page – Simon & Schuster)
https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Parasitic-Mind/Gad-Saad/9781621579939
Gad Saad – Psychology Today contributor page
https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/contributors/gad-saad-phd
Suicidal Empathy (Audible Canada listing – includes release date/details)
https://www.audible.ca/pd/Suicidal-Empathy-Audiobook/B0FZ6JMVFQ
In late 2024 and early 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump repeatedly referred—sometimes jokingly, sometimes provocatively—to the idea of Canada becoming the “51st state.” These remarks reportedly began during conversations with then–Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and later appeared in public comments tied to trade disputes, tariffs, and economic leverage. Early reporting in both U.S. and Canadian outlets frequently described the remarks as characteristic of Trump’s hyperbolic negotiation style rather than as indicators of formal U.S. policy.
Canadian media coverage, however, quickly amplified the comments. Headlines and commentary increasingly framed the remarks as symbolic of American overreach or a potential threat to Canadian sovereignty. This framing coincided with heightened public attention to U.S.–Canada trade tensions and broader anxieties about economic dependence.
Following Trudeau’s resignation and Mark Carney’s rise to Liberal leadership, a snap federal election was called for April 28, 2025. At the outset of the campaign, the Liberals were trailing significantly in public polling. During the campaign, Liberal messaging increasingly emphasized the need to “stand up” to Trump-era pressure, warning that a Conservative government led by Pierre Poilievre could leave Canada exposed to U.S. demands or coercion. References to Trump’s “51st state” comments featured prominently in this broader narrative.
The election concluded with an unexpected Liberal minority victory, widely interpreted by commentators as influenced by a surge in nationalist sentiment and voter backlash against perceived American bullying. After the election, no U.S. policy moves or official statements suggested any genuine intent to pursue annexation, and Trump’s remarks continued to be linked primarily to trade pressure rather than territorial ambition.
Analytical Interpretation.
From an analytical standpoint, this sequence of events raises questions about how ambiguous external rhetoric can be transformed into domestic political leverage. Trump’s comments were provocative but informal; their political impact in Canada appears to have depended less on their substance than on how they were framed, repeated, and contextualized within a domestic campaign.
One interpretation is that Canadian media dynamics and electoral incentives interacted to elevate a symbolic remark into a perceived existential issue. In this reading, uncertainty itself became politically useful: the lack of a clear U.S. position allowed competing narratives to flourish, some of which emphasized worst-case scenarios rather than probable outcomes.
Another, more charitable interpretation is that heightened sensitivity to sovereignty concerns was a rational response to Trump’s unpredictability. Even without formal policy intent, critics argue, repeated rhetorical pressure from a powerful neighbor can legitimately influence voter behavior and campaign strategy.
A third interpretation lies between these poles: that while no annexation threat existed, the rhetoric nonetheless provided a mobilizing frame that shifted attention away from domestic issues such as housing affordability, inflation, and economic stagnation. Whether this constituted deliberate fear-manufacturing or opportunistic narrative adaptation is ultimately a matter of judgment rather than documentation.
Inviting the Reader’s Conclusion
What is clear is that the “51st state” rhetoric had political consequences in Canada despite the absence of any corresponding policy action. Whether those consequences reflect justified caution, media amplification, strategic political framing, or some combination of all three remains open to interpretation.
Readers may reasonably conclude that the episode demonstrates how modern democratic politics often operate less on concrete policy threats than on perceived risk shaped by narrative repetition. Others may see it as a case study in responsible vigilance toward an erratic ally. The available evidence supports multiple readings—and the distinction between them depends less on disputed facts than on how one interprets political incentives and media behavior in high-stakes elections.
Selected Sources
BBC News – Canadian PM reveals Trump brought up ‘51st state’ on March call (April 2025)
The Guardian – Trump’s chaotic threats won Mark Carney the Canadian election (April 2025)
The New York Times – On Canada’s Election Day, Trump Repeats ‘51st State’ Threat (April 2025)
CBC News – Carney says Trump raised ‘51st state’ during their call (April 2025)
CBS News – Canada’s Liberal Party wins election in turnaround seen as reaction to Trump threats (April 2025)
Wikipedia – 2025 Canadian federal election (accessed January 2026)
For most of my adult life, I identified as left-of-centre. I supported progressive policies on social issues, the environment, and equality. But over the past few years—especially now, at 51—I’ve found myself increasingly out of step with parts of the contemporary left. Not because my values changed, but because many of the policies being pushed today feel more disruptive than constructive. They often reshape core institutions, family structures, or economic systems without clear evidence that the changes will work long-term.
This isn’t a turn toward extremism. I still care deeply about compassion, fairness, and progress. What has changed is my tolerance for sweeping experimentation without rigorous testing. I want policy that is incremental, evidence-based, and willing to adjust when data shows something isn’t working. That’s not ideology—it’s responsibility.Seeking evidence-driven solutions isn’t inherently “right-wing.” Both sides claim to follow the data, but in practice, good policy should transcend labels. Historically, Canadian conservatism has often embodied this approach: balanced budgets, stable institutions, and pragmatic reforms that build on what already works rather than tearing systems down in pursuit of unproven theories.
Yet critics are quick to slap on labels like “Maple MAGA”—a term meant to equate any Canadian centre-right view with the most polarizing elements of U.S. Trumpism. It’s a lazy shortcut, designed to shut down conversation rather than understand it. Not every conservative is a populist firebrand. Many people—myself included—are simply tired of rapid, ideologically driven changes that risk destabilizing society without demonstrating clear benefits.
I’m not closed off. If strong evidence emerges showing that bold progressive policies genuinely improve stability, opportunity, and quality of life, I’m willing to reconsider. But right now, I see more promise in cautious, proven approaches that respect the complexity of the systems we’re trying to improve.
What about you? Have your views shifted as you’ve gained more life experience? I’m interested in real dialogue: no smears, no lazy labels, and no assumptions that a shift in perspective means abandoning core values.
In recent years, Canadian public schools have increasingly incorporated political themes into extracurricular events, including winter concerts. A widely discussed example occurred at Karen Kain School of the Arts in Toronto, where Grade 8 students performed a skit during a December “winter concert” featuring protest‑style signs such as “Give Back Stolen Land” and “Land Back.” The performance replaced traditional seasonal programming with messaging aligned with the contemporary “Land Back” movement. While the intent may have been to highlight Indigenous history, the choice of format and venue raises important questions about the appropriate boundaries between education and activism in publicly funded schools.
To evaluate this incident fairly, it is essential to distinguish between curricular education—which is mandated, necessary, and valuable—and extracurricular political advocacy, which carries different expectations and responsibilities.
Ontario’s curriculum explicitly requires students to learn about Indigenous histories, treaties, residential schools, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Calls to Action. These topics are not optional; they are embedded in the Social Studies and History curriculum for Grades 1–8. Teaching them is not activism—it is education grounded in historical fact and national responsibility. When taught in the classroom, these subjects can be explored with nuance, context, and opportunities for critical thinking.
The issue at Karen Kain is not the subject matter itself, but the format and framing. A winter concert is traditionally a community‑building event: inclusive, celebratory, and accessible to families of all backgrounds. Parents attend expecting music, dance, or drama that reflects seasonal themes or showcases student creativity. Transforming such an event into a protest‑style performance shifts the purpose from celebration to advocacy. It also removes the pedagogical safeguards—balanced discussion, guided inquiry, and contextual explanation—that exist in the classroom.
The “Land Back” movement, while rooted in legitimate discussions about Indigenous rights and historical treaties, is also a politically contested movement with a wide range of interpretations and significant implications for land ownership, governance, and public policy. Presenting it through slogans and protest imagery, without space for analysis or alternative perspectives, risks conveying a single ideological stance rather than fostering informed understanding. For 13‑ and 14‑year‑old students, who are still developing the ability to evaluate complex political claims, this can blur the line between learning about a movement and being encouraged to endorse it.
This concern is not hypothetical. Surveys consistently show that many Canadian parents prefer schools to avoid pushing students toward political activism, even on causes they personally support. Parents generally want schools to prioritize academic learning, critical thinking, and balanced instruction rather than advocacy. When extracurricular events adopt activist framing, it can erode trust by making families feel blindsided or excluded from decisions about what messages their children are asked to perform publicly.
None of this means schools should avoid difficult topics or silence discussions of Indigenous rights. On the contrary, these subjects deserve thoughtful, rigorous treatment. But context matters. A winter concert is not the venue for dramatizing contested political movements. Doing so risks reducing complex issues to slogans, bypassing critical engagement, and placing students in the role of political actors rather than learners.
A healthier approach would preserve the distinction between education and advocacy. Teach Indigenous history thoroughly in the classroom, as the curriculum requires. Encourage students to analyze movements like Land Back with intellectual seriousness. But keep extracurricular performances focused on inclusive, community‑oriented themes that unite rather than divide.
By maintaining this boundary, schools can honour both their educational mission and their responsibility to provide neutral, welcoming environments for all families—ensuring that learning remains grounded in inquiry, not activism, and that public events remain spaces of shared celebration rather than ideological theatre.
References
Original Incident and Reporting
Pfahl, Chanel (@ChanLPfa). “A parent at the Toronto District School Board sent me these pictures from the ‘Winter Concert’…” X (formerly Twitter), 18 Dec. 2025. https://x.com/ChanLPfa/status/2001719861723173203
“Toronto Grade 8 students stage ‘Land Back’ protest at school ‘winter concert’.” Juno News, 19 Dec. 2025. https://www.junonews.com/p/toronto-grade-8-students-stage-land
Ontario Curriculum Requirements
Ontario Ministry of Education. “Indigenous Education in Ontario.” Government of Ontario, updated 2 Sept. 2025. https://www.ontario.ca/page/indigenous-education-ontario
“Indigenous history, culture now mandatory part of Ontario curriculum.” CBC News, 8 Nov. 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/indigenous-history-culture-mandatory-ontario-curriculum-1.4393527
Context on the “Land Back” Movement
“The Indigenous ‘Land Back’ Movement: A Land Mine for Canadians.” C2C Journal, 28 Oct. 2024. https://c2cjournal.ca/2024/10/the-indigenous-land-back-movement-a-land-mine-for-canadians/
Parental Attitudes Toward Activism in Schools
Zwaagstra, Michael, and Alex MacPherson. “Canadian parents don’t want schools to push students into political activism.” Fraser Institute, 2024. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/commentary/canadian-parents-dont-want-schools-to-push-students-into-political-activism
Skate Canada’s decision to boycott national and international events in Alberta is a masterclass in self-sabotage. By refusing to host competitions in the province over the Fairness and Safety in Sport Act—which restricts female categories to biological females—Skate Canada has effectively admitted that its commitment to “inclusion” means prioritizing the feelings of transgender-identifying males over the safety, fairness, and privacy of girls and women in sport. This isn’t progressive; it’s predatory, as it signals that the organization is willing to endanger female athletes rather than enforce categories based on biological reality.
The irony is staggering: Skate Canada claims to uphold “safe and inclusive sport,” yet by punishing an entire province, it excludes thousands of Alberta skaters from convenient high-level opportunities while virtue-signaling about inclusion. Alberta’s law, in effect since September 2025, protects female competitors from inherent physical advantages retained by biological males, a concern backed by basic physiology and echoed in growing international restrictions. Instead of adapting or advocating for open/mixed categories, Skate Canada chooses exclusion in the name of inclusion—revealing a captured institution more concerned with ideological purity than the integrity of women’s figure skating.
This move should serve as a wake-up call. Taxpayer-funded organizations like Skate Canada that actively harm women’s sports by boycotting provinces protecting female athletes deserve immediate defunding and reform. If they can’t support fair competition without discriminating against biological reality, they have no business governing Canadian skating. Alberta girls deserve better than an organization that treats their safety as optional.
bleatmop
Mystro
Dead Wild Roses 
Your opinions…