You are currently browsing the category archive for the ‘Public Policy’ category.
There is a reason the recent interview on TRIGGERnometry featuring Andrew Wilson has drawn attention. Wilson does not simply argue positions; he shifts the ground beneath them. In a discussion about subjective morality and objective truth, that ability is decisive. Much of his effectiveness comes not from the novelty of his claims, but from the speed and clarity with which he forces his interlocutors to confront the implications of their own assumptions.
At the center of his argument is a compressed but powerful move. If morality is subjective, then moral claims reduce to preference. If they reduce to preference, then disagreement cannot be resolved through appeal to truth, but only through assertion and enforcement. From there, the conclusion follows: without objective morality, ethics collapses into power. It is a clean chain of reasoning, rhetorically efficient and difficult to interrupt in real time, especially when opponents have not fully examined the foundations of their own views.
Part of what makes this approach so effective is that it presses on a genuine weakness in much contemporary moral discourse. Secular arguments about morality often appeal to harm, fairness, or consensus. These are intuitively compelling and widely shared, but they are not self-grounding in a strict sense. They rely on assumptions that are rarely defended at a deeper level. When Wilson asks why these principles should bind anyone who does not already accept them, the hesitation that follows is real. Moral language tends to present itself as if it refers to something objective, even when speakers explicitly deny that such objectivity exists. That tension creates an opening, and Wilson exploits it with precision.
There is, in other words, a strong version of his argument. If moral claims are entirely subjective, then their authority becomes difficult to justify beyond the boundaries of a given framework. The question “why should anyone outside your system care?” is not rhetorical; it is a genuine challenge. It exposes the gap between the way people speak about morality and the way they often ground it, if they ground it at all. On this point, Wilson is not merely performing. He is identifying a real philosophical pressure.
The difficulty lies in what follows. Wilson moves from the observation that subjective morality has grounding problems to the conclusion that it therefore collapses into power. That step is doing more work than it appears. It bypasses a large middle space in which most moral systems actually operate. Societies do not typically function by reducing all moral claims to arbitrary preference, nor do they rely on universally agreed metaphysical truths. They operate through a combination of norms, institutions, reciprocal expectations, and forms of reasoning that are neither purely objective nor wholly arbitrary. These structures impose real constraints on behavior. They shape incentives, establish boundaries, and generate predictability over time.
A simple example makes the point. Most people keep small promises—returning a borrowed item, showing up when they say they will—not because of objective moral truth, but because repeated interaction makes reliability valuable and defection costly. Over time, those expectations harden into norms that feel binding, even if their origin is entirely practical.
Underlying Wilson’s move is an assumption that if a claim is not objectively grounded, it has no binding force. That assumption is not obviously correct. Much of what governs human behavior lacks objective grounding in a strict philosophical sense. Laws, contracts, and social norms are not objective truths in the way physical laws are, yet they bind behavior effectively. Their force arises from shared expectations, enforcement mechanisms, and the long-term costs of violation. The relevant question, then, is not simply whether morality is objective, but what kinds of systems are capable of generating stable and predictable constraints on human conduct.
“Wilson doesn’t defeat morality without objectivity—he defeats weaker versions of it faster than they can defend themselves.”
Wilson’s own solution—grounding morality in God—does attempt to solve this problem by anchoring obligation outside human preference. Whether that succeeds is a separate question. It secures authority for those who accept it, but does not obviously resolve disagreement among those who do not.
This is where the conversation in the interview begins to fragment. Wilson is arguing at the level of justification: what ultimately grounds moral claims and gives them authority. The hosts, by contrast, are operating at the level of function: how moral systems work in practice and how societies maintain order and cooperation. These are related but distinct questions. One concerns philosophical legitimacy; the other concerns social viability. When they are treated as interchangeable, the discussion collapses into confusion. Wilson’s advantage is that he keeps the focus tightly on justification, where his binary framing is strongest. The hosts attempt to shift toward function, but without fully articulating how functional systems can resist the collapse he describes, their responses remain incomplete.
A more effective reply would have acknowledged the grounding problem while resisting the forced conclusion. Even if morality is not objectively grounded, it does not follow that it is arbitrary or that it reduces to raw power. Systems of cooperation and constraint can emerge from the conditions of human life itself: shared vulnerability, repeated interaction, and the high cost of disorder. These factors generate incentives for stable norms and predictable behavior. They do not eliminate conflict or disagreement, but they provide a framework within which those disagreements can be managed without constant recourse to coercion.
This does not eliminate the binding problem entirely. Functional systems explain why cooperation emerges and persists, but they do not fully answer why an individual should comply when defection is advantageous and enforcement is weak. That tension remains, even in the most stable societies.
Wilson’s rhetorical strength lies in the fact that he does not need to defeat this more complex position. He only needs to expose the instability of a weaker one. Once his opponents concede that morality is subjective without offering a robust account of how subjective systems generate binding norms, he can recast their position as preference backed by social pressure and, ultimately, by force. That recasting is not entirely wrong, but it is incomplete. It compresses a complicated reality into a stark alternative, and in doing so it gains persuasive force at the cost of nuance.
The result is an argument that is both powerful and limited. It succeeds as a critique of poorly grounded moral subjectivism, but it overreaches when it claims that subjectivity necessarily entails collapse into power. In practice, moral systems occupy a space between objective truth and arbitrary preference. They are constructed, negotiated, and enforced, but they are also constrained by human conditions that make certain arrangements more stable than others.
Wilson is, in this sense, asking a legitimate question. The problem is that he answers it too quickly. By collapsing the range of possible moral systems into a binary, he forces clarity but sacrifices accuracy. That trade-off is what makes him such an effective debater. It is also what limits the depth of the conclusions he draws.
We feel safe in places like Alberta for a simple reason. Not because the system is especially gentle, and not because people are unusually kind, but because we believe the rules will be enforced, reliably and without fear or favour.
That belief does most of the work. It sits quietly in the background of daily life, doing its job precisely because it rarely has to announce itself. You don’t need to know the Criminal Code in detail. You only need to trust that when someone breaks it in a serious way, the response will reduce the chance of it happening again.
When that belief weakens, the shift is subtle at first. It doesn’t arrive as a declaration. It shows up in patterns. Arrest, release, reoffend, repeat. People notice, not as legal experts, but as observers of outcomes. The conclusion they draw is not complicated: the system is no longer reliably containing those who break its rules.
That is where trust begins to erode.
In Canada, this question intersects with a specific and sensitive legal reality. Sentencing is not strictly uniform. Courts are required to consider the unique systemic and historical circumstances of Indigenous offenders through what are commonly called Gladue factors, originating in R v Gladue and reaffirmed in R v Ipeelee. These rulings direct judges to account for the effects of residential schools, displacement, and intergenerational trauma when determining an appropriate sentence.
The intent here is not trivial. Indigenous Canadians make up roughly 4 to 5 percent of the population, yet account for over 30 percent of those in custody, with incarceration rates approaching ten times that of non-Indigenous Canadians. A justice system that ignored that disparity entirely would risk perpetuating injustice under the banner of neutrality.
That is the strongest case for Gladue principles, and it deserves to be taken seriously.
“A system that adjusts sentencing to account for historical injustice may be justified in principle. But if those adjustments affect how long repeat offenders are incapacitated, the question is not ideological. It is practical: does the system reduce harm?”
But a justice system is not judged by intent alone. It is judged by outcomes, particularly where public safety is concerned. And those outcomes sit alongside another set of facts that are harder to keep in view.
Indigenous women experience violent victimization at more than double the national rate. They are killed at rates several times higher than non-Indigenous women. Much of this violence occurs within known social networks rather than as random acts, which places the question of repeat offending and system response directly at the centre of the issue.
At the same time, recidivism is not a marginal phenomenon. Data from Correctional Service Canada shows that a significant proportion of offenders reoffend after release, with rates notably higher among Indigenous offenders. That does not make reoffending inevitable. It does establish that risk is real, and that it clusters.
Placed together, these realities create a tension that cannot be resolved by appeal to intent alone. A system that adjusts sentencing to account for historical injustice may be justified in principle. But that same system operates in a world where victimization is not evenly distributed, and where recidivism is not negligible. If those adjustments meaningfully affect how long repeat offenders are incapacitated, then the question is not ideological. It is practical: does the system, in aggregate, reduce harm?
To ask that question is not to deny the moral foundation of the policy. It is to take it seriously enough to test it against reality.
This is where the conversation often breaks down. Raising the issue is treated as a signal of bias rather than a request for evaluation. But a high-trust society cannot function on selective clarity. It has to be able to hold two things in view at once: that historical injustice matters, and that the primary function of a justice system is to protect the public from repeat harm. These aims are not mutually exclusive. But neither are they automatically aligned.
If they come into tension, and in some cases they do, the answer cannot be to ignore the friction because it is uncomfortable. Nor can it be to retreat into abstract claims about equality that bypass real differences in circumstance. The harder task is to examine whether the current balance is working as intended.
None of this implies that Gladue principles should be abandoned, nor that historical context should be ignored. It implies something narrower, and more demanding. Any system that modifies sentencing must also ensure that high-risk, repeat offenders, regardless of background, are reliably identified and contained. If those goals cannot be reconciled in practice, then the framework requires adjustment, not rhetorical defense.
Because the cost of getting this wrong is not abstract. It is paid in the quiet erosion of trust, and in the lived reality of those most exposed to harm.
High-trust societies are not sustained by kindness alone. They are sustained by the belief that rules are enforced, that serious harm is contained, and that the system works in the direction of protection. When that belief weakens through patterns rather than proclamations, trust does not collapse all at once.
It erodes.
And once it erodes far enough, it does not matter how compassionate the system intended to be.
It will no longer be believed.

Glossary
Gladue Factors
Legal considerations requiring Canadian judges to account for the unique systemic and historical circumstances affecting Indigenous offenders when determining a sentence. These can include the legacy of residential schools, intergenerational trauma, and community conditions.
R v Gladue
A Supreme Court of Canada decision establishing that courts must consider the background and systemic factors affecting Indigenous offenders under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.
R v Ipeelee
A follow-up Supreme Court decision reinforcing that Gladue principles must be applied in all cases involving Indigenous offenders and clarifying their importance in sentencing.
Recidivism
The tendency of a convicted individual to reoffend after being released from custody or completing a sentence.
High-Trust Society
A society in which individuals broadly believe that institutions, laws, and fellow citizens operate predictably and fairly, reducing the need for constant vigilance or defensive behavior.
References
Statistics Canada – Indigenous victimization and incarceration data
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2023001/article/00006-eng.htm
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2023001/article/00004-eng.htm
Correctional Service Canada – Recidivism data
https://www.canada.ca/en/correctional-service/corporate/library/research/emerging-results/19-02.html
Department of Justice Canada – Gladue background and application
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/gladue/p2.html
National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls – Final report and findings
https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/final-report/
R v Gladue – Full decision (CanLII)
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1999/1999canlii679/1999canlii679.html
R v Ipeelee – Full decision (CanLII)
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2012/2012scc13/2012scc13.html
The scandal around the Southern Poverty Law Center matters for one reason above all: it exposes a mechanism.
If the allegations now before a U.S. court are borne out, the charge is stark: an organization built to fight extremism may have been financially entangled with the very actors it claims to oppose. The SPLC says this was an informant program. The Department of Justice says it was something else.
That distinction matters legally. But analytically, the incentive structure is already visible.
Create the threat. Amplify the threat. Position yourself as the authority on the threat. Then monetize the response.
That loop is the story.
And once you see it, you can’t unsee it.
Because the real danger isn’t confined to one American organization. It’s the export model.
“When institutions depend on a problem for their legitimacy, they do not simply respond to it.
They begin—slowly, rationally—to ensure it never goes away.”
In Canada, the same structural incentives are in play. Groups like the Canadian Anti-Hate Network operate within a system where funding, relevance, and authority are tied to the persistence of “hate” as a visible social problem. They do not need to fund extremists to reproduce the same dynamic. They only need to expand the boundary of what counts as extremism.
That is the quieter version of the same loop.
If your mandate depends on the persistence of a threat, then ambiguity becomes an asset. Lines blur. Categories stretch. Dissent edges toward designation. Over time, the distance between “wrong” and “dangerous” collapses.
You don’t need burning crosses if you can redefine disagreement as harm.
This is where the SPLC story stops being scandal and starts becoming signal.
Because the underlying logic is identical:
- The problem must persist
- The threat must remain legible
- The institution must remain necessary
And if reality doesn’t supply enough fuel, the system has incentives to… supplement.
That doesn’t always mean fabrication. More often, it means selection, amplification, and framing. The worst examples are elevated. Edge cases become representative. Boundaries widen quietly.
Until the label “hate” no longer describes a phenomenon—it polices a conversation.
That’s the iceberg.
The visible scandal is shocking because it’s crude. Funding extremists while fundraising against extremism is a contradiction people can grasp immediately. But the more sophisticated version—the one that operates through classification, narrative control, and institutional trust—is harder to detect and far more durable.
And once embedded, it reshapes discourse itself.
People self-censor and institutions defer. Then the obsequious journalists haphazardly cite.
With no regard for truth the designation becomes the argument.
At that point, the system no longer needs to prove anything. It only needs to point.
The SPLC case, if proven, is the blunt instrument version of the problem. The more durable form operates without headlines, through incentives that reward threat maintenance over problem resolution.
That is the real risk.
Because when institutions depend on a problem for their legitimacy, they do not simply respond to it.
They begin, slowly and rationally, to ensure it never goes away.

Sources for readers
- US Department of Justice: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-grand-jury-charges-southern-poverty-law-center-wire-fraud-false-statements-and
- CNBC report on the federal indictment of the SPLC:
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/21/splc-indicted-doj-extremism-funding.html - The Guardian coverage including SPLC’s response and defense:
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/apr/21/splc-indictment-doj-response - Juno News reporting on Canadian Anti-Hate Network funding and criticism: https://junonews.com/2025/03/15/canadian-anti-hate-network-government-funding-controversy/
In a previous piece, I described what happens when ideas move from abstraction into mass use. They tend to lose fidelity along the way. What begins as theory arrives as posture, and what returns is often a reinforced version of something only partially understood.
That process raises a second question.
What kinds of systems can survive that kind of pressure?
Whether we are talking about an ideology, a scientific framework, or a political structure, the answer is less mysterious than it first appears. The systems that endure—and, more importantly, the ones that improve over time—share a common feature: they contain some built-in way of correcting their own errors.
At some point in their operation, they turn inward. They compare outcomes to expectations, theory to reality, and allow that comparison to have consequences. When the mismatch becomes difficult to ignore, something gives. Assumptions are revised, methods adjusted, conclusions reconsidered. Not always quickly, and rarely cleanly, but the process exists.
Without that phase, a system can still function for a time. It can even appear successful. But it has no reliable way to distinguish between being right and merely being unchallenged.
This is where the divergence begins.
Some systems treat failure as information. Others treat it as an external intrusion. In the first case, error becomes a resource—something to be examined, incorporated, and learned from. In the second, it becomes something to be explained away, often by shifting attention outward.
The pattern is familiar. When predictions fail, the explanation drifts toward circumstances, interference, or incomplete implementation, rather than toward the model itself.
That difference is not cosmetic. It determines whether a system gradually converges toward reality or begins to drift away from it.
Certain ideological systems illustrate the problem. When outcomes fail to match predictions, the failure is often attributed not to the theory itself, but to contamination from external forces—imperfect implementation, hostile environments, insufficient commitment. The theory remains intact; the world is judged to have fallen short.
“If no possible outcome can count as disconfirming evidence, a system doesn’t just resist error—it begins to accumulate it.”
That move preserves internal coherence, at least on the surface, but it comes at a cost. If no possible outcome can count as disconfirming evidence, then the system has insulated itself from correction. It can adapt in form—changing language, adjusting strategy—while leaving its core assumptions largely untouched.
In practice, this kind of insulation does not operate in a vacuum. Correction, when it happens, is often forced from the outside—through competition, failure, or pressure from systems that are less tolerant of error. The process is uneven, sometimes delayed, and not always recognized for what it is.
Still, the underlying constraint remains.
No system is exempt from it. Any framework that cannot absorb disconfirming evidence will eventually begin to separate from the reality it claims to describe, regardless of how compelling its starting assumptions may have been.
Where error cannot be internalized, it does not disappear. It accumulates.
And once that accumulation becomes visible, trust begins to erode—not necessarily because people have worked through the theory in detail, but because the outputs no longer align with what they can see for themselves.
This is where the two dynamics meet.
Ideas that lose fidelity as they spread place additional strain on the systems that carry them. If those systems can absorb and correct for that loss, they tend to stabilize. If they cannot, the distortion compounds.
The difference is not a matter of intent or intelligence. It is structural.
A system that cannot, or will not, update itself in response to reality does not simply make mistakes it will simply accumulate them.






Your opinions…