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In the last post, we left a question hanging:

When scientific claims change, are we getting closer to reality—or just watching consensus shift?

That question only holds together if we blur two different things into one.


The Quiet Category Error

When people say “science is a social construct,” they usually point to things that are obviously true.

Research is funded by institutions. Papers move through journals. Experts decide what gets published. Language shapes how ideas are framed.

All of that is real.

None of it defines the core activity.

The mistake is simple: treating the systems around science as if they determine what makes a scientific claim true.


What Actually Gets Tested

Strip everything else away and science becomes something much more basic.

People build models of the world. Then they test them.

Not by agreement. Not by status.

By what happens when those models meet reality.

The ones that survive tend to do a few things well. They predict outcomes with some reliability. They explain more than their competitors. They hold together internally. And when new data arrives, they adjust without collapsing.

You don’t need to formalize those criteria to see them in action. You see them every time an idea quietly disappears because it stops working.

That disappearance isn’t negotiated.

It’s forced.


Influence Isn’t Determination

At this point the pushback comes quickly.

“Of course science is shaped by social forces.”

It is.

Those forces shape which questions get asked, which projects get funded, how results are presented, and how quickly findings spread. They can slow progress. They can distort it. Sometimes they can derail it for a while.

But they don’t determine whether a model tracks reality.

That’s the line.

You can delay discovery. You can confuse it. You can wrap it in bad language.

You can’t make a false model reliably predict outcomes just by agreeing that it does.


The Strong Claim—and the Weaker One

There’s a distinction that tends to get skipped.

A weaker claim says: science is socially embedded. That’s true and not especially controversial.

A stronger claim says: scientific truth itself is negotiated—shaped by power, language, and consensus.

That’s the one doing the real work.

And it doesn’t hold up under pressure.

If truth were negotiated, models wouldn’t behave the way they do across different contexts. They wouldn’t converge. They wouldn’t travel.


Pluto Didn’t Change

Take the familiar example of Pluto.

At one point, there were nine planets. Now there are eight.

On the surface, that looks like a shifting fact.

But nothing about Pluto changed. What changed was the classification system, refined in response to better observations and clearer criteria.

Run that process again—with the same data, in different countries, under different institutions—and you land in the same place.

That’s not consensus creating truth.

That’s constraint forcing alignment.


Authority Doesn’t Carry the Argument

Another social constructivist argument leans on expertise.

Science is what recognized experts agree on. Experts are socially validated. Therefore science is socially constructed.

Except that’s not how progress behaves.

Clyde Tombaugh discovered Pluto without formal credentials.

Michael Faraday made foundational contributions to electromagnetism with little formal training.

Their work wasn’t accepted because of status.

It was accepted because it held up.

Credentials can signal competence. They don’t determine whether a model survives contact with the world.


When Bias Enters, Science Starts to Fail

The strongest objection points to real failures.

“What about biased or harmful science?”

Those cases matter.

But look closely at what they show.

Take the Tuskegee syphilis study. It wasn’t just unethical. It was methodologically broken—biased sampling, invalid comparisons, contaminated conditions.

The result wasn’t just immoral.

It was useless as knowledge.

The same pattern appears elsewhere. Once ideology starts steering the model, predictive accuracy drops. Explanations weaken. The work stops holding together.

That isn’t science revealing its true nature.

That’s science breaking down.


A Brief Note on Paradigm Shifts

You’ll sometimes hear this framed in terms of paradigm shifts.

“If scientific frameworks change, doesn’t that mean knowledge is constructed?”

Frameworks do shape how data gets interpreted.

They don’t rescue models that fail.

When predictions stop landing and explanations start stretching, the model gives way.

Not because consensus changed.

Because it stopped working.


The Outer Layers Still Matter

None of this denies the obvious.

Funding is political. Publication standards are negotiated. Ethics are socially enforced.

These shape the environment science operates in. They can slow it down. They can distort it. They can even temporarily misdirect it.

But they don’t decide what’s true.

Because truth, in this context, isn’t assigned.

It’s encountered out there in the wild.


Back to the Tension

So when scientific claims change, what are we seeing?

Sometimes it’s better data refining a model. Sometimes it’s uncertainty narrowing over time.

Sometimes it’s institutional incentives shaping how results are framed.

The two get mixed together.

That’s why it feels unstable.

But only one of those layers determines whether the model actually works.


The Constraint That Holds

You can treat science as just another narrative shaped by power.

If you do, its authority collapses into politics.

Or you can recognize the constraint:

Reality pushes back.

It pushes back the same way regardless of who’s asking the question, what language they use, or which institution is involved.

That doesn’t make science perfect.

It makes it bounded.

And that boundary is the reason it works at all.


Where That Leaves Us

Science changes.
Scientists are biased.
Institutions are political.

None of that makes the core activity a social construct.

Because the core isn’t built out of agreement.

It’s built out of whether the model survives contact with the world and makes no distinction of who you are.

 


Glossary

Social Construct
An idea or category whose defining features depend on social agreement and can vary across cultures (e.g., money, legal systems).

Scientific Model
A structured representation used to explain and predict phenomena.

Empirical Constraint
The requirement that a model must align with observable reality.

Predictive Accuracy
How reliably a model forecasts outcomes.

Explanatory Power
How well a model accounts for observed phenomena relative to alternatives.

Coherence
Internal consistency within a model.

Model Robustness
The ability to adapt to new data without collapsing.

References

  There is a reason the recent interview on TRIGGERnometry featuring Andrew Wilson has drawn attention. Wilson does not simply argue positions; he shifts the ground beneath them. In a discussion about subjective morality and objective truth, that ability is decisive. Much of his effectiveness comes not from the novelty of his claims, but from the speed and clarity with which he forces his interlocutors to confront the implications of their own assumptions.

At the center of his argument is a compressed but powerful move. If morality is subjective, then moral claims reduce to preference. If they reduce to preference, then disagreement cannot be resolved through appeal to truth, but only through assertion and enforcement. From there, the conclusion follows: without objective morality, ethics collapses into power. It is a clean chain of reasoning, rhetorically efficient and difficult to interrupt in real time, especially when opponents have not fully examined the foundations of their own views.

Part of what makes this approach so effective is that it presses on a genuine weakness in much contemporary moral discourse. Secular arguments about morality often appeal to harm, fairness, or consensus. These are intuitively compelling and widely shared, but they are not self-grounding in a strict sense. They rely on assumptions that are rarely defended at a deeper level. When Wilson asks why these principles should bind anyone who does not already accept them, the hesitation that follows is real. Moral language tends to present itself as if it refers to something objective, even when speakers explicitly deny that such objectivity exists. That tension creates an opening, and Wilson exploits it with precision.

There is, in other words, a strong version of his argument. If moral claims are entirely subjective, then their authority becomes difficult to justify beyond the boundaries of a given framework. The question “why should anyone outside your system care?” is not rhetorical; it is a genuine challenge. It exposes the gap between the way people speak about morality and the way they often ground it, if they ground it at all. On this point, Wilson is not merely performing. He is identifying a real philosophical pressure.

The difficulty lies in what follows. Wilson moves from the observation that subjective morality has grounding problems to the conclusion that it therefore collapses into power. That step is doing more work than it appears. It bypasses a large middle space in which most moral systems actually operate. Societies do not typically function by reducing all moral claims to arbitrary preference, nor do they rely on universally agreed metaphysical truths. They operate through a combination of norms, institutions, reciprocal expectations, and forms of reasoning that are neither purely objective nor wholly arbitrary. These structures impose real constraints on behavior. They shape incentives, establish boundaries, and generate predictability over time.

A simple example makes the point. Most people keep small promises—returning a borrowed item, showing up when they say they will—not because of objective moral truth, but because repeated interaction makes reliability valuable and defection costly. Over time, those expectations harden into norms that feel binding, even if their origin is entirely practical.

Underlying Wilson’s move is an assumption that if a claim is not objectively grounded, it has no binding force. That assumption is not obviously correct. Much of what governs human behavior lacks objective grounding in a strict philosophical sense. Laws, contracts, and social norms are not objective truths in the way physical laws are, yet they bind behavior effectively. Their force arises from shared expectations, enforcement mechanisms, and the long-term costs of violation. The relevant question, then, is not simply whether morality is objective, but what kinds of systems are capable of generating stable and predictable constraints on human conduct.

“Wilson doesn’t defeat morality without objectivity—he defeats weaker versions of it faster than they can defend themselves.”

Wilson’s own solution—grounding morality in God—does attempt to solve this problem by anchoring obligation outside human preference. Whether that succeeds is a separate question. It secures authority for those who accept it, but does not obviously resolve disagreement among those who do not.

This is where the conversation in the interview begins to fragment. Wilson is arguing at the level of justification: what ultimately grounds moral claims and gives them authority. The hosts, by contrast, are operating at the level of function: how moral systems work in practice and how societies maintain order and cooperation. These are related but distinct questions. One concerns philosophical legitimacy; the other concerns social viability. When they are treated as interchangeable, the discussion collapses into confusion. Wilson’s advantage is that he keeps the focus tightly on justification, where his binary framing is strongest. The hosts attempt to shift toward function, but without fully articulating how functional systems can resist the collapse he describes, their responses remain incomplete.

A more effective reply would have acknowledged the grounding problem while resisting the forced conclusion. Even if morality is not objectively grounded, it does not follow that it is arbitrary or that it reduces to raw power. Systems of cooperation and constraint can emerge from the conditions of human life itself: shared vulnerability, repeated interaction, and the high cost of disorder. These factors generate incentives for stable norms and predictable behavior. They do not eliminate conflict or disagreement, but they provide a framework within which those disagreements can be managed without constant recourse to coercion.

This does not eliminate the binding problem entirely. Functional systems explain why cooperation emerges and persists, but they do not fully answer why an individual should comply when defection is advantageous and enforcement is weak. That tension remains, even in the most stable societies.

Wilson’s rhetorical strength lies in the fact that he does not need to defeat this more complex position. He only needs to expose the instability of a weaker one. Once his opponents concede that morality is subjective without offering a robust account of how subjective systems generate binding norms, he can recast their position as preference backed by social pressure and, ultimately, by force. That recasting is not entirely wrong, but it is incomplete. It compresses a complicated reality into a stark alternative, and in doing so it gains persuasive force at the cost of nuance.

The result is an argument that is both powerful and limited. It succeeds as a critique of poorly grounded moral subjectivism, but it overreaches when it claims that subjectivity necessarily entails collapse into power. In practice, moral systems occupy a space between objective truth and arbitrary preference. They are constructed, negotiated, and enforced, but they are also constrained by human conditions that make certain arrangements more stable than others.

Wilson is, in this sense, asking a legitimate question. The problem is that he answers it too quickly. By collapsing the range of possible moral systems into a binary, he forces clarity but sacrifices accuracy. That trade-off is what makes him such an effective debater. It is also what limits the depth of the conclusions he draws.

There’s a low-grade feeling in the background of a lot of conversations right now that something isn’t quite working the way it used to.

Not broken. Not collapsing. Just… off.

The rules still exist. The institutions still function. On paper, everything is in place. But the sense that things are moving in the direction they claim to be moving has started to thin, and people tend to notice that long before they can explain it.

It’s difficult to point to a single cause. That’s part of why the feeling lingers. When something breaks, you can name it. When something drifts, you feel it first and only understand it later.

That unease tends to show up when the quiet constraints that keep systems stable begin to weaken.

In law, it looks like uneven enforcement. In politics, it shows up when power stops feeling like something that will eventually change hands. More generally, it appears whenever positions begin to feel fixed rather than contingent.

Most of the time, these constraints operate in the background. They don’t need to be defended constantly because they are demonstrated often enough that people take them for granted. You see rules applied. You see consequences land. You see people leave positions they once held.

That’s usually enough.

When those patterns become less consistent, the system doesn’t collapse. It adjusts. Power becomes a little less exposed, a little more predictable, but not in a reassuring way. Access narrows, not through explicit barriers, but through familiarity and repetition.

You start to see the same outcomes, or at least the same kinds of outcomes, and they become easier to anticipate.

At first, most people adapt without thinking much about it. Systems can absorb a surprising amount of this kind of drift. But the adjustment isn’t free. It changes how people relate to the system itself.

They rely on it less. They work around it more. And eventually, they stop assuming that the rules being stated are the rules that actually matter.

That shift is quiet, but it matters.

This is not an argument that the past was fair, pure, or evenly experienced. Many people never experienced the old constraints as neutral. The point is narrower. When the public no longer believes the operative rules match the stated rules, trust begins to thin.

Analysts of collapse tend to focus on endpoints. Resource exhaustion. Rising complexity. External shock. Those accounts are valuable, and they explain why systems eventually fail.

What they describe less clearly is the phase that comes before that.

The point where the system still functions, but no longer feels like it is working as intended.

That phase is where most people live, and it is where most systems are decided.

Because once a system reaches the point where it requires constant effort to maintain the appearance of fairness, the cost of sustaining it begins to rise. Not just in money, but in attention, coordination, and trust.

More oversight gets added. More process. More intervention. Each change is meant to correct a small imbalance. Taken together, they make the system heavier and harder to move.

At some point, the question shifts. It’s no longer just whether the system is fair or efficient. It becomes whether it is worth maintaining in its current form.

That’s where drift turns into something else.

Not collapse in the dramatic sense, but simplification. People disengage. Participation drops. Compliance becomes selective. The system doesn’t explode. It contracts.

If that is the direction of travel, then the question is not how to prevent collapse entirely. No system avoids change indefinitely.

The question is how to restore the constraints that keep drift from becoming the default condition.

The answer is less dramatic than most people expect.

It doesn’t require perfect leaders, sweeping reform, or a complete redesign of institutions. It requires something more basic, and more difficult to sustain.

The system has to demonstrate, consistently and visibly, that its constraints still hold.

That demonstration has to be more than messaging.

It has to take the form of consequences that land where they should, including on allies, insiders, and institutions themselves. It means oversight with teeth, rules applied even when politically inconvenient, and positions that remain genuinely vulnerable to replacement rather than quietly secured over time.

These are not abstract principles. They are operational ones.

A system that enforces its rules selectively teaches people to look for exceptions. A system that allows power to settle teaches people that outcomes are predetermined. A system that avoids disruption teaches people that disruption is no longer possible.

Reversing that drift doesn’t happen through messaging. It happens through action, repeated often enough that people begin to believe what they are seeing again.

Trust is not restored by argument. It is restored by demonstration.

And that demonstration has to be visible enough that people can recognize it without being told what it means.

That is the path forward.

Not a guarantee of stability. Not a return to some idealized past. But a re-establishment of the conditions under which systems remain both legible and worth participating in.

Because the alternative is not immediate collapse, it is something a little more quieter and under the radar.

A system that continues to function, but no longer convinces.

 

Suggested Further Reading

If this line of thinking resonates, these works explore different parts of the same problem from complementary angles:

  • The Collapse of Complex SocietiesJoseph Tainter
    A clear account of how increasing complexity yields diminishing returns, and why systems often simplify rather than fail dramatically.
  • CollapseJared Diamond
    Examines how societies respond—successfully or not—to environmental, political, and economic pressures over time.
  • Guns, Germs, and SteelJared Diamond
    A broader look at how geography and structural conditions shape long-term societal development and stability.
  • Rivers of Gold, Rivers of BloodAnthony Quinn
    Explores how wealth, empire, and resource flows influence power, expansion, and institutional behavior.
  • Altered Carbon — created by Laeta Kalogridis (based on the novel by Richard K. Morgan)
    A speculative take on what happens when one of society’s most fundamental constraints—biological exit—is removed entirely.

 

 

  We feel safe in places like Alberta for a simple reason. Not because the system is especially gentle, and not because people are unusually kind, but because we believe the rules will be enforced, reliably and without fear or favour.

That belief does most of the work. It sits quietly in the background of daily life, doing its job precisely because it rarely has to announce itself. You don’t need to know the Criminal Code in detail. You only need to trust that when someone breaks it in a serious way, the response will reduce the chance of it happening again.

When that belief weakens, the shift is subtle at first. It doesn’t arrive as a declaration. It shows up in patterns. Arrest, release, reoffend, repeat. People notice, not as legal experts, but as observers of outcomes. The conclusion they draw is not complicated: the system is no longer reliably containing those who break its rules.

That is where trust begins to erode.

In Canada, this question intersects with a specific and sensitive legal reality. Sentencing is not strictly uniform. Courts are required to consider the unique systemic and historical circumstances of Indigenous offenders through what are commonly called Gladue factors, originating in R v Gladue and reaffirmed in R v Ipeelee. These rulings direct judges to account for the effects of residential schools, displacement, and intergenerational trauma when determining an appropriate sentence.

The intent here is not trivial. Indigenous Canadians make up roughly 4 to 5 percent of the population, yet account for over 30 percent of those in custody, with incarceration rates approaching ten times that of non-Indigenous Canadians. A justice system that ignored that disparity entirely would risk perpetuating injustice under the banner of neutrality.

That is the strongest case for Gladue principles, and it deserves to be taken seriously.

“A system that adjusts sentencing to account for historical injustice may be justified in principle. But if those adjustments affect how long repeat offenders are incapacitated, the question is not ideological. It is practical: does the system reduce harm?”

But a justice system is not judged by intent alone. It is judged by outcomes, particularly where public safety is concerned. And those outcomes sit alongside another set of facts that are harder to keep in view.

Indigenous women experience violent victimization at more than double the national rate. They are killed at rates several times higher than non-Indigenous women. Much of this violence occurs within known social networks rather than as random acts, which places the question of repeat offending and system response directly at the centre of the issue.

At the same time, recidivism is not a marginal phenomenon. Data from Correctional Service Canada shows that a significant proportion of offenders reoffend after release, with rates notably higher among Indigenous offenders. That does not make reoffending inevitable. It does establish that risk is real, and that it clusters.

Placed together, these realities create a tension that cannot be resolved by appeal to intent alone. A system that adjusts sentencing to account for historical injustice may be justified in principle. But that same system operates in a world where victimization is not evenly distributed, and where recidivism is not negligible. If those adjustments meaningfully affect how long repeat offenders are incapacitated, then the question is not ideological. It is practical: does the system, in aggregate, reduce harm?

To ask that question is not to deny the moral foundation of the policy. It is to take it seriously enough to test it against reality.

This is where the conversation often breaks down. Raising the issue is treated as a signal of bias rather than a request for evaluation. But a high-trust society cannot function on selective clarity. It has to be able to hold two things in view at once: that historical injustice matters, and that the primary function of a justice system is to protect the public from repeat harm. These aims are not mutually exclusive. But neither are they automatically aligned.

If they come into tension, and in some cases they do, the answer cannot be to ignore the friction because it is uncomfortable. Nor can it be to retreat into abstract claims about equality that bypass real differences in circumstance. The harder task is to examine whether the current balance is working as intended.

None of this implies that Gladue principles should be abandoned, nor that historical context should be ignored. It implies something narrower, and more demanding. Any system that modifies sentencing must also ensure that high-risk, repeat offenders, regardless of background, are reliably identified and contained. If those goals cannot be reconciled in practice, then the framework requires adjustment, not rhetorical defense.

Because the cost of getting this wrong is not abstract. It is paid in the quiet erosion of trust, and in the lived reality of those most exposed to harm.

High-trust societies are not sustained by kindness alone. They are sustained by the belief that rules are enforced, that serious harm is contained, and that the system works in the direction of protection. When that belief weakens through patterns rather than proclamations, trust does not collapse all at once.

It erodes.

And once it erodes far enough, it does not matter how compassionate the system intended to be.

It will no longer be believed.

Glossary

Gladue Factors
Legal considerations requiring Canadian judges to account for the unique systemic and historical circumstances affecting Indigenous offenders when determining a sentence. These can include the legacy of residential schools, intergenerational trauma, and community conditions.

R v Gladue
A Supreme Court of Canada decision establishing that courts must consider the background and systemic factors affecting Indigenous offenders under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

R v Ipeelee
A follow-up Supreme Court decision reinforcing that Gladue principles must be applied in all cases involving Indigenous offenders and clarifying their importance in sentencing.

Recidivism
The tendency of a convicted individual to reoffend after being released from custody or completing a sentence.

High-Trust Society
A society in which individuals broadly believe that institutions, laws, and fellow citizens operate predictably and fairly, reducing the need for constant vigilance or defensive behavior.


References

Statistics Canada – Indigenous victimization and incarceration data
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2023001/article/00006-eng.htm
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2023001/article/00004-eng.htm

Correctional Service Canada – Recidivism data
https://www.canada.ca/en/correctional-service/corporate/library/research/emerging-results/19-02.html

Department of Justice Canada – Gladue background and application
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/gladue/p2.html

National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls – Final report and findings
https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/final-report/

R v Gladue – Full decision (CanLII)
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1999/1999canlii679/1999canlii679.html

R v Ipeelee – Full decision (CanLII)
https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2012/2012scc13/2012scc13.html

 

 

The scandal around the Southern Poverty Law Center matters for one reason above all: it exposes a mechanism.

If the allegations now before a U.S. court are borne out, the charge is stark: an organization built to fight extremism may have been financially entangled with the very actors it claims to oppose. The SPLC says this was an informant program. The Department of Justice says it was something else.

That distinction matters legally. But analytically, the incentive structure is already visible.

Create the threat. Amplify the threat. Position yourself as the authority on the threat. Then monetize the response.

That loop is the story.

And once you see it, you can’t unsee it.

Because the real danger isn’t confined to one American organization. It’s the export model.

“When institutions depend on a problem for their legitimacy, they do not simply respond to it.

They begin—slowly, rationally—to ensure it never goes away.”

In Canada, the same structural incentives are in play. Groups like the Canadian Anti-Hate Network operate within a system where funding, relevance, and authority are tied to the persistence of “hate” as a visible social problem. They do not need to fund extremists to reproduce the same dynamic. They only need to expand the boundary of what counts as extremism.

That is the quieter version of the same loop.

If your mandate depends on the persistence of a threat, then ambiguity becomes an asset. Lines blur. Categories stretch. Dissent edges toward designation. Over time, the distance between “wrong” and “dangerous” collapses.

You don’t need burning crosses if you can redefine disagreement as harm.

This is where the SPLC story stops being scandal and starts becoming signal.

Because the underlying logic is identical:

  • The problem must persist
  • The threat must remain legible
  • The institution must remain necessary

And if reality doesn’t supply enough fuel, the system has incentives to… supplement.

That doesn’t always mean fabrication. More often, it means selection, amplification, and framing. The worst examples are elevated. Edge cases become representative. Boundaries widen quietly.

Until the label “hate” no longer describes a phenomenon—it polices a conversation.

That’s the iceberg.

The visible scandal is shocking because it’s crude. Funding extremists while fundraising against extremism is a contradiction people can grasp immediately. But the more sophisticated version—the one that operates through classification, narrative control, and institutional trust—is harder to detect and far more durable.

And once embedded, it reshapes discourse itself.

People self-censor and institutions defer. Then the obsequious journalists haphazardly cite.

With no regard for truth the designation becomes the argument.

At that point, the system no longer needs to prove anything. It only needs to point.

The SPLC case, if proven, is the blunt instrument version of the problem. The more durable form operates without headlines, through incentives that reward threat maintenance over problem resolution.

That is the real risk.

Because when institutions depend on a problem for their legitimacy, they do not simply respond to it.

They begin, slowly and rationally, to ensure it never goes away.

Sources for readers

   In a previous piece, I described what happens when ideas move from abstraction into mass use. They tend to lose fidelity along the way. What begins as theory arrives as posture, and what returns is often a reinforced version of something only partially understood.

That process raises a second question.

What kinds of systems can survive that kind of pressure?

Whether we are talking about an ideology, a scientific framework, or a political structure, the answer is less mysterious than it first appears. The systems that endure—and, more importantly, the ones that improve over time—share a common feature: they contain some built-in way of correcting their own errors.

At some point in their operation, they turn inward. They compare outcomes to expectations, theory to reality, and allow that comparison to have consequences. When the mismatch becomes difficult to ignore, something gives. Assumptions are revised, methods adjusted, conclusions reconsidered. Not always quickly, and rarely cleanly, but the process exists.

Without that phase, a system can still function for a time. It can even appear successful. But it has no reliable way to distinguish between being right and merely being unchallenged.

This is where the divergence begins.

Some systems treat failure as information. Others treat it as an external intrusion. In the first case, error becomes a resource—something to be examined, incorporated, and learned from. In the second, it becomes something to be explained away, often by shifting attention outward.

The pattern is familiar. When predictions fail, the explanation drifts toward circumstances, interference, or incomplete implementation, rather than toward the model itself.

That difference is not cosmetic. It determines whether a system gradually converges toward reality or begins to drift away from it.

Certain ideological systems illustrate the problem. When outcomes fail to match predictions, the failure is often attributed not to the theory itself, but to contamination from external forces—imperfect implementation, hostile environments, insufficient commitment. The theory remains intact; the world is judged to have fallen short.

“If no possible outcome can count as disconfirming evidence, a system doesn’t just resist error—it begins to accumulate it.”

That move preserves internal coherence, at least on the surface, but it comes at a cost. If no possible outcome can count as disconfirming evidence, then the system has insulated itself from correction. It can adapt in form—changing language, adjusting strategy—while leaving its core assumptions largely untouched.

In practice, this kind of insulation does not operate in a vacuum. Correction, when it happens, is often forced from the outside—through competition, failure, or pressure from systems that are less tolerant of error. The process is uneven, sometimes delayed, and not always recognized for what it is.

Still, the underlying constraint remains.

No system is exempt from it. Any framework that cannot absorb disconfirming evidence will eventually begin to separate from the reality it claims to describe, regardless of how compelling its starting assumptions may have been.

Where error cannot be internalized, it does not disappear. It accumulates.

And once that accumulation becomes visible, trust begins to erode—not necessarily because people have worked through the theory in detail, but because the outputs no longer align with what they can see for themselves.

This is where the two dynamics meet.

Ideas that lose fidelity as they spread place additional strain on the systems that carry them. If those systems can absorb and correct for that loss, they tend to stabilize. If they cannot, the distortion compounds.

The difference is not a matter of intent or intelligence. It is structural.

A system that cannot, or will not, update itself in response to reality does not simply make mistakes it will simply accumulate them.

Peter Boghossian recently offered a blunt explanation for a pattern that keeps confusing otherwise sensible people: why do parts of the far left reject reforms that would plainly improve public institutions?

Because improvement is not the goal.

His point is simple and ugly. Widespread distrust is not an accidental byproduct of the project. It is the project. Once you understand that, a good deal of otherwise baffling behavior stops being baffling.

Most normal people still assume institutions are flawed but fixable. You identify the problem, apply targeted reforms, restore confidence, and move forward. That model only works if you believe the institution has legitimacy to begin with.

But if you believe the system is oppressive at the root, then reform becomes a threat. Reform stabilizes. It restores credibility. It gives ordinary people a reason to think the institution can work. That, in turn, weakens the deeper claim that the whole structure must be replaced.

That is the real pivot.

When an institution is judged illegitimate in principle, making it function better is not progress. It is betrayal.

You can see this logic across multiple domains.

Take policing. There are decades of incremental reforms aimed at reducing misconduct and increasing accountability: body cameras, improved training, procedural reforms, better supervision, smarter deployment. None of these require abolishing the institution. Yet much of the activist energy after 2020 did not center on reform but on delegitimization: defund, abolish, systemic rot. The point was not to make policing more trustworthy. The point was to make trust itself look naive.

The same pattern appears in universities. The legitimacy problem here is obvious enough that even casual observers can see it. Entire disciplines operate with strikingly narrow viewpoint diversity. The easiest possible trust-building reform would be to widen that range, even modestly. Boghossian’s line about putting “Republicans in sociology departments” works precisely because the ask is so small. If institutional credibility mattered, this would be low-hanging fruit. The refusal to do even that suggests that credibility is not the objective.

The pattern extends further than those two examples. Courts, media, bureaucracies, corporations, elections—again and again, incremental fixes are dismissed as cosmetic. The rhetoric moves quickly from flawed to structural, from structural to systemic, from systemic to irredeemable. Once that move is complete, reform itself becomes suspect. If a change makes the institution more trusted, it is condemned for helping preserve something that, in the activist imagination, deserves to fall.

There is, to be fair, a serious version of the opposing argument. Sometimes institutions really do absorb small reforms in order to preserve larger injustices. In those cases, reform can function as a pressure valve rather than a cure. That argument has force in isolated cases.

Applied universally, it hardens into dogma.

If every institution is corrupt at the root, and every reform is dismissed as insufficient by definition, then no improvement can ever count as evidence. Distrust is no longer a conclusion drawn from performance. It becomes a prior commitment. At that point, the argument stops being diagnostic and becomes theological.

What sharpens Boghossian’s observation is the context in which he made it. He was responding to a discussion about the strategic use of institutional distrust as a political weapon. That matters because the logic is no longer confined to one faction. Different actors now use different language to sell the same underlying message: the system is captured, illegitimate, beyond repair, and unworthy of loyalty. The branding varies. The effect does not.

Delegitimization replaces reform.

And when both ideological extremes converge on the claim that institutions cannot be repaired, the political center—where repair actually happens—begins to disappear. That is not a healthy equilibrium. It is unsustainable.

This also clarifies why evidence-based reform so often fails to persuade true believers. You can show improved outcomes. You can demonstrate lower abuse, better process, stronger accountability, fairer procedures. It will not matter to people whose real argument is not about performance but legitimacy. They are not asking whether the institution is getting better. They are asking whether it deserves to survive.

That distinction matters.

It means reform is still necessary, but not for the reason many assume. Reform is necessary for the persuadable public, for ordinary citizens who still want institutions that work and can still distinguish corruption from legitimacy. It is not likely to win over those already committed to collapse.

It also means the defense of institutions has to be more explicit than many liberals seem comfortable making it. Not blind loyalty. Not sentimental trust. Not a denial of failure. Something firmer than that: flawed, self-correcting institutions are worth defending because the alternatives to reform are usually far worse than reform’s imperfections.

Something always fills the vacuum.

It is rarely better.

Boghossian’s insight matters because it strips away a comforting illusion. Many people still assume everyone in public life is arguing, however bitterly, about how to make institutions function better. They are not. Some are arguing about whether those institutions deserve to exist at all.

Once you see that clearly, the repeated rejection of easy reforms stops looking irrational. It starts looking strategic.

And strategies aimed at destroying trust cannot be answered by trust alone. They have to be met with reforms that work and with the confidence to say, plainly, that imperfect institutions are still worth defending.

References

Primary source

Suggested supporting references

  • Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958–2024
  • National Academies of Sciences, Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities
  • Cynthia Lum et al., systematic review on body-worn cameras
  • Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, The Social and Political Views of American Professors
  • Mitchell Langbert et al., research on faculty political imbalance

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